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Terry in the Age of Automated Police Officers 
Ric Simmons* 
Robots are now commonplace tools for law enforcement.  The current 
generation of police robots is largely limited to remote-controlled robots that 
are designed to perform specific tasks, such as search-and-rescue drones and 
bomb-disposal robots.  But the use of robots in law enforcement is likely to 
increase dramatically in the near future, since robots provide numerous benefits 
to police departments, including greater efficiency, increased capability, and 
enhanced safety for human officers.  Therefore, in the near future, law 
enforcement agencies will begin to deploy semi-autonomous robots for two 
primary and interrelated functions: surveillance and patrol. 
These new machines will dramatically increase the number of interactions 
between civilians and police robots, which will force courts to reconsider the 
rules of engagement for when police confront suspects.  Many of the existing 
rules give the police broad powers to search or use force in order to protect 
officer safety; however, if no human police officer is on the scene, there is no 
justification for these broad powers. 
Specifically, although semi-autonomous police robots will be permitted to 
conduct Terry stops (and will likely be more accurate in determining reasonable 
suspicion), they will not be permitted to conduct a frisk.  These robots will also 
not be permitted to conduct protective sweeps of homes when making an arrest, 
nor engage in a protective search of a car during a traffic stop, and their power 
to conduct a search incident to an arrest will be limited.  Courts will also need 
to revisit the use-of-force rules when applying them to robot police officers; 
these machines will almost never be permitted to use deadly force, and their use 
of non-deadly force will be strictly curtailed.  The result will be an increase in 
visual surveillance—as more robot police with enhanced sensory capabilities 
are deployed—but a decrease in physical surveillance and physical altercations 
between police and civilians. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For decades, police robots have been a staple of science fiction.1  These 
fictional machines are usually fully autonomous, independently making 
 
 1  The most famous portrayal of a police robot is Robocop, who stars in a trilogy of 
eponymous movies from the late 1980s and early 1990s and is also the subject of a reboot in 
2014.  Robocop is technically a cyborg (part human and part machine), and he is portrayed as 
a moral hero and also as an incredibly effective, nearly unstoppable, crime-fighting tool.  
Robocop’s programming forbids him from harming innocent people or breaking the law.  The 
Robocop movies also feature an all-machine robot, known as the ED-209, which carries 
absurdly heavy firepower for domestic law enforcement and whose programming apparently 
allows it to fatally shoot civilians within seconds if the civilian does not obey its commands.  
See ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures 1987).  Another, less famous robot police officer is R Daneel 
Olivaw, who originally appeared in Isaac Asimov’s Caves of Steel and made numerous 
appearances in other books.  Daneel is also portrayed as a hero, and since he is bound by the 
Laws of Robotics, he cannot harm any people, guilty or innocent.  See ISAAC ASIMOV, THE 
CAVES OF STEEL (Doubleday 1954).  More commonly, robot police officers appear as plot 
devices or background characters in science fiction, serving to make the setting more 
“futuristic.”  See e.g., STAR TREK (Paramount Pictures 2009) (a robot police officer on a 
hoverbike attempts to pull over a pre-teenage James Kirk who is joyriding in his stepfather’s 
car).  In these examples too, though, robot police officers are usually portrayed as law-abiding, 
helpful, protective of humans, respectful, and efficient. 
These portrayals of robot police officers contrast with robots’ general portrayal in science 
fiction, which is usually violent and/or destructive to society, usually because of their 
programming or their reaction to being treated poorly by humans.  See, e.g., 2001: A SPACE 
ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (HAL 9000 kills the crew of a spaceship); THE 
TERMINATOR (Cinema ‘84 1984) (T-800 sent back in time to kill the mother of the future 
leader of the human resistance; in later sequels, the T-800s were programmed to protect 
humans, but inevitably other robots are sent back to kill those humans); BLADE RUNNER 
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critical decisions about when to arrest a suspect and whether to use deadly 
force.  Thus, their programmers must give these robots specific directives 
that guide their interactions with civilians.  Almost uniformly, these 
directives result in robot officers that are more law-abiding and respectful to 
civilians than the average human police officer.2 
Police robots have now moved out of the realm of science fiction, onto 
our streets, and into the skies above us.  Hundreds of police departments 
across the country use robots for specific tasks, such as aerial search-and-
rescue and bomb disposal.3  In 2016, a Dallas police department ended a 
standoff with an active shooter by using a remote-controlled robot to kill the 
suspect with explosives.4  This incident set off a flurry of attention on the use 
of police robots, both in the national news5 and in legal academia.6  These 
news stories and articles focused on the legal challenges posed by arming 
police robots.  Many discussed how to program robots to ensure that they—
like the police robots of science fiction—always obey the law when 
 
(Warner Bros. 1982) (Replicants escape from space mining camps and come to Earth to find 
their creator, killing numerous humans along the way). 
 2  The original Robocop famously has four directives: (1) Serve the public trust; (2) 
Protect the innocent; (3) Uphold the law; and (4) Any attempt to arrest a senior officer of the 
corporation that created him results in shutdown.  The first three make him a perfect, hyper-
ethical police officer; the fourth is an Easter Egg inserted by a high-level corrupt corporate 
officer so that Robocop cannot arrest him for their own malfeasance.  See ROBOCOP, supra 
note 1.  Daneel Olivaw follows the Laws of Robotics: (1) A robot may not injure a human 
being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; (2) A robot must obey the 
orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First 
Law; and (3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Laws.  These force him to be protective of humans but also 
mean that he has to rely upon human police partners to conduct some parts of a police officer’s 
job.  See CAVES OF STEEL, supra note 1. 
 3  See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.   
 4  See Henry Fountain & Michael S. Schmidt, “Bomb Robot” Takes down Dallas 
Gunman, but Raises Enforcement Questions, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), https://www.nytime 
s.com/2016/07/09/science/dallas-bomb-robot.html.  
 5  See, e.g., E.B. Boyd, Is Police Use of Force About to Get Worse—With Robots?, 
POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/police-robots-
ethics-debate-214273. 
 6  See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 516 
(2016); Zachary A. Kaplan, Note, R2D2 or iRobot: Can Armed Robots Be a Friend to Police 
Without Being a Foe to the Public?, 32 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 603 (2018); 
Michael Sinclair, Proposed Rules to Determine the Legal Use of Autonomous and Semi-
Autonomous Platforms in Domestic U.S. Law Enforcement, 20 N.C.  J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 
(2018); Thomas Wanebo, Comment, Remote Killing and the Fourth Amendment: Updating 
Constitutional Law to Address Expanded Police Lethality in the Robotic Age, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 976 (2018).  Even before the 2016 incident in Dallas, regulating deadly use of force was 
the primary focus of most scholarship on police robots.  See also Alexandra A. Breshears, 
Comment, Use of Armed Drones by Domestic Law Enforcement: Presence and the Fourth 
Reasonableness Factor, 33 W. MICH. U. COOLEY L. REV. 183 (2016).  
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detaining suspects or using force against civilians.  These questions are 
somewhat premature, since modern-day police robots never act 
autonomously when they interact with civilians.  But even the remote-
controlled and semi-autonomous robots of today present challenges to some 
of the fundamental doctrines governing police power and privacy rights. 
Over the next decade, police will be using robots for routine tasks such 
as surveillance and patrol, which will dramatically increase the number of 
interactions between civilians and police robots.7  This development will 
force courts to reconsider the rules of engagement that they have set down 
for when police confront suspects.  Many of the existing rules give the police 
broad powers to search or use force in order to protect officer safety, and if 
a human police officer is no longer on the scene, there is no justification for 
these broad powers.  This article argues that robot police officers will 
represent a trade-off for police departments: policing will be safer and more 
efficient, but the legal authority of robot police officers will be curtailed. 
Part I of this article will provide an overview of how the public and 
private police currently use robots and look ahead to how robots will be used 
in the future.  Part II examines how the use of these robots will undermine 
the current legal regime governing police/civilian interaction, including 
Terry stops, searches incident to a lawful arrest, and regulations on use of 
force.  Part III reflects on how the equilibrium adjustment theory will apply 
to this new development, and discusses how police will adjust their behavior 
to conform to the new rules.  It is possible that Terry frisks have become 
such a foundational tactic of law enforcement that courts will change the 
justification for the frisks to allow them to continue even when officer safety 
is not threatened.8 
II.  A BRIEF PRIMER ON POLICE ROBOTS 
A.  A Taxonomy of Robots 
The most common definition of a robot is “any machine that can collect 
information, process it, and use it to act upon the world.”  For the purposes 
of this article, our definition will be a bit different.  It will be narrower in the 
sense that we are only going to include machines that are mobile and can act 
in a physical, rather than merely virtual, sense.  Thus, a “bot” that exists only 
on a computer or on the internet will not qualify.  It will be broader because 
it will include any mobile machine that can sense and act, even if it cannot 
do much in the way of thinking.  Using this revised definition, police robots 
 
 7  See infra notes 23–34 and accompanying text. 
 8  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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can be divided into three categories: remote-controlled, semi-autonomous, 
and fully autonomous.9 
“Remote-controlled” robots are mobile machines that do no more than 
respond to commands from a human operator.  These devices have no 
decision-making ability of their own.  Examples of these devices that are 
currently being used by law enforcement include surveillance drones flown 
by remote control or bomb-disposal robots controlled by bomb squad 
technicians. “Semi-autonomous” robots are able to operate without any 
human input and do so for the majority of the time; however, they are 
designed for humans to take control during critical moments.  These robots 
are able to navigate on their own and handle simple interactions with 
civilians, and some of them also have an algorithm built into their 
programming that evaluates their inputs and determines whether a situation 
seems suspicious enough to alert their human monitor.  Although public 
police are only just starting to adopt semi-autonomous robots in this country, 
these devices are becoming more common among private security 
companies and foreign police forces.  Finally, “fully autonomous” robots can 
conduct all of their operations without any human input.  These machines 
can be designed to complete a set of basic functions, such as patrol an area 
and interact with the environment or with civilians in pre-programmed ways 
in response to certain circumstances.10  Given the many complex decisions 
required for policing, fully autonomous police robots do not yet exist outside 
the realm of science fiction. 
B. The Present and Near Future of Police Robots 
The current generation of police robots consists of remote-controlled 
robots that are designed to perform specific tasks.11  These robots are 
 
 9  These categories are set out in Sinclair, supra note 6, at 14–15.  Like most 
commentators in this area, Judge Sinclair focuses on the use of force by robots, and notes that 
for semi-autonomous robots, the critical “decision point” about who should act between the 
robot and the human occurs at the point where armed force is necessary.  Sinclair, supra note 
6, at 14. 
 10  In reality, there are no bright lines that separate these three categories.  Most remote-
controlled robots have some amount of autonomous programming, such as the ability to 
perform multi-stepped tasks based on a single command or fly on autopilot if they temporarily 
lose their connection with their human pilot.  And as semi-autonomous robots become more 
sophisticated, they will be programmed to automatically respond in more complicated ways 
to a wider range of inputs, until they will rarely need human intervention.  Finally, even the 
fully autonomous robots will likely contain an override so that human beings can take control 
of the machine in extraordinary circumstances. 
 11  Even putting aside actual robots, police officers regularly integrate technology into 
their jobs, by using onboard computers in their cars, big data analysis in their investigations, 
and smart phone apps, including apps that provide the Miranda warnings and DUI test 
instructions, apps that search the penal codes and apps that help witnesses identify vehicles 
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primarily of two different types: search-and-rescue drones12 and bomb-
disposal robots.13  But recently police officers have been using these robots 
in innovative ways: to conduct basic surveillance,14 monitor traffic,15 
investigate active shooters,16 analyze crime scenes,17 sweep locations for 
booby traps before officers enter,18 investigate locations that are inaccessible 
or too dangerous for human police officers,19 or even to disable20 or disarm 
suspects.21 
Recently, law enforcement agencies have begun to adopt semi-
autonomous robots for two primary and interrelated functions: surveillance 
and patrol.22  Many private security companies already use such devices.  
 
that they saw.  This reliance on technology for everyday work tasks in not unique to police 
officers.  Some anthropologists have provocatively declared that modern humans have in 
many ways already become cyborgs because of our frequent use and dependence on machines 
to communicate, store and retrieve data, and interact with the outside world.  See, e.g., Are 
Our Devices Turning Us into a New Kind of Human?, NPR TED RADIO HOUR (Sept. 11, 2015) 
(downloaded at https://www.npr.org/2015/09/11/438944317/are-our-devices-turning-us-
into-a-new-kind-of-human) (anthropologist Amber Case presents her TED talk “We Are All 
Cyborgs Now”). 
 12  As of 2018, over 900 police departments were using surveillance drones.  See Ashley 
Southall & Ali Winston, New York Police Say They Will Deploy 14 Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/nyregion/nypd-drones.html. 
 13  As of 2016, there were over 987 bomb detection robots being used by 280 police 
departments around the country.  Dan Gettinger & Arthur Holland Michel, Law Enforcement 
Robots Datasheet, CTR. FOR STUDY DRONE BARD C. (July 11, 2016), 
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/law-enforcement-robots-datasheet/. 
 14  Marco Margaritoff, Drones in Law Enforcement: How, Where and When They’re 
Used, DRIVE (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.thedrive.com/aerial/15092/drones-in-law-
enforcement-how-where-and-when-theyre-used.   
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Boyd, supra note 5. 
 19  See Gettinger & Michel, supra note 13.  Some police SWAT teams employ a device 
called a “throwbot”—a small robot they can throw into a barricaded room or building during 
a standoff to assess the situation.  Id.  See also Boyd, supra note 18; Sinclair, supra note 6, at 
12 (police departments using robots for bomb disposal and to assist in high-risk entry 
situations). 
 20  See Gettinger & Michel, supra note 13.  
 21  Richard Winton & Matt Hamilton, Man vs. Machine: L.A. Sheriff’s Deputies Use 
Robot to Snatch Rifle from Barricaded Suspect, End Standoff, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-robot-barricaded-suspect-lancaster-
20160915-snap-story.html. 
 22  Surveillance involves monitoring certain locations to detect criminal activity; this 
could involve widespread, continuous monitoring of large areas, or targeted monitoring of a 
specific person or location upon individualized suspicion.  Patrol involves establishing a 
mobile, physical presence in an area to deter criminal activity and to decrease response time 
once criminal activity has been detected.  See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
  As of October 2019, the private company Knightscope had leased seventy of their 
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One example is the Cobalt robot that patrols the Yelp headquarters in San 
Francisco.  Cobalt robots are approximately five feet tall, shaped like large, 
blue traffic cones, and equipped with a high-definition camera, a directional 
microphone, and an infrared sensor.23  The Cobalt robot navigates through 
office buildings autonomously, patrolling for any sign of trouble.24  A human 
monitor watches the video feeds of a number of roaming Cobalts from a 
remote location.25  The robot’s programming is able to identify potentially 
suspicious situations, such as a window that has been left open or the 
presence of a person in a restricted area, which will trigger an alert to the 
human monitor.26  If the monitor receives an alert, or if she herself sees 
something on the video feeds that seems suspicious, she takes control of the 
robot and directs its movements.27  The human monitor can also speak 
through the robot, giving commands to individuals who the robot might 
encounter, such as an order to scan a security badge into the robot’s sensor 
or a demand to leave the area.28  Other fully autonomous robots owned by 
private security firms patrol shopping malls and parking lots, equipped with 
thermal imagers that can detect intruders at night and cameras that can read 
license plates to report speeders or stolen cars.29 
Public police robots will have a similar job, but on a much larger scale: 
hundreds of such robots can wheel along city sidewalks, acting as mobile, 
interactive surveillance cameras, with one police officer supervising ten or 
twenty devices at a time.  If the robot’s programming identifies anything 
unusual,30 or the human monitor observes suspicious activity, the monitor 
can take control of the robot and investigate further by asking questions of 
 
RoboCop models to public police forces around the country.  Although they are not yet 
directly connected to the police departments, they are able to record what is going on around 
them and deliver that information to the police.  The most recent models have a 360-degree 
high-definition live video stream, the ability to read 1,200 license plates per minute, and the 
ability to track mobile phone use.  See Fabienne Lang, Police Robot Ignores Woman’s Call 
for Help in an American Park, INTERESTING ENG’G (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://interestingengineering.com/ 
police-robot-ignores-womans-call-for-help-in-an-american-park. 
 23  Robbie Gonzalez, I Spent the Night with Yelp’s Robot Security Guard, Cobalt, WIRED 
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/i-spent-the-night-with-yelps-robot-security-
guard-cobalt/. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Shan Li, Robots Are Becoming Security Guards. “Once It Gets Arms . . . It’ll Replace 
All of Us,” L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-robots-retail-
20160823-snap-story.html. 
 30  See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text for examples of how security robots in 
other countries identify suspicious behavior. 
SIMMONS(DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2020  4:42 PM 
916 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:909 
 
the individuals who are present or directing the robot’s camera or other 
sensors to look at specific locations or objects. 
Other countries have already begun using semi-autonomous robots for 
public policing.  The “E-Patrol Robot Sherriff” in China patrols public places 
and uses facial recognition technology to scan for suspects in its database.  
When it detects a person who is wanted by law enforcement, it alerts the 
human police and begins following the suspect until the police arrive.31  
South Korea began testing a five-foot-tall dog-shaped robot named “Robo-
Guard,” which autonomously patrols the corridors of prisons.32  Robo-Guard 
has artificial intelligence that can detect abnormal prisoner activity such as 
aggressive behavior towards other inmates or suicidal tendencies, and then 
alert the humans in the control room.33  Other countries have police robots 
that perform more benign law enforcement functions.  For example, the 
police robot in Dubai patrols tourist attractions and shopping malls, and can 
detect known fugitives using its surveillance camera and facial recognition 
capabilities, but people can also ask it for directions, pay fines, access police 
information, and report crimes.34 
C.  Benefits and Costs of Police Robots 
Many of the benefits of using police robots are obvious.  First and 
foremost, semi-autonomous and fully autonomous robots used for 
surveillance and crowd control act as a force multiplier.  Like many other 
types of new technology, robots allow police to leverage resources; one 
police chief said that a drone is “like having twenty police officers on patrol 
or more.”35  As noted in the previous section, private security agencies save 
significant resources by using one human to monitor multiple semi-
autonomous robots on patrol; the robots and the individual officer cost only 
a fraction of the cost of a human security team.36  The ratio of robots to 
 
 31  Thomas Page, The Inevitable Rise of the Robocops, CNN (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/22/tech/robot-police-officer-future-dubai/index.html. 
 32  Elizabeth Fish, Forget RoboCop: Robo-Guard Patrols Korean Prisons, Foresees 
Trouble, PCWORLD (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.pcworld.com/article/253713/forget_roboco 
p_robo_guard_patrols_korean_prisons_forsees_trouble.html. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Page, supra note 31. 
 35  Matt Alderton, To the Rescue! Why Drones in Police Work Are the Future of Crime 
Fighting, REDSHIFT (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.autodesk.com/redshift/drones-in-police-
work-future-crime-fighting/.  A CEO of a company that provides drones to police describes 
his product as “a live version of Google Earth, only with a full TiVo capability . . . .  It allows 
us to rewind time and go back and see events that we didn’t know occurred at the time they 
occurred.”  Id. 
 36  See Gonzalez, supra note 23.  The tech company Yelp hired Cobalt robotics to provide 
security for their officer park and reported that the cost was “between $30,000 (the annual 
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human pilots will also increase as the semi-autonomous robots are 
programmed to deal with more and more situations on their own.37  And 
although robots need maintenance and upkeep, they can work nearly around 
the clock, and they never call in sick or underperform out of laziness or 
boredom.38  Given the fact that patrol officers typically make up a majority 
of a police department’s budget,39  this increased efficiency will allow police 
to either increase the amount of surveillance and investigation that they 
perform, or allow them to do the same amount of surveillance and 
investigation for less money.  This would free up resources for more human-
based tasks, such as interviewing witnesses or conducting long-term 
investigations.40 
A second benefit of robot police officers is their increased capability.  
Like many other machines used by police, including Breathalyzers, 
surveillance cameras, and radar guns, most robots can do things that human 
beings cannot do.  We have already seen that search-and-rescue drones can 
cover more territory than a human police officer, while bomb-disposal robots 
can access areas inaccessible to human police officers.41  And almost all 
robots, whether used for patrol or surveillance, have sensors that are more 
sophisticated than human senses.  Aerial drones equipped with thermal 
imaging have found the bodies of missing persons42 and runaway children 
 
cost of monitoring an office full of security cameras) and $300,000 (the annual cost of a flesh-
and-blood security detail).”  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 30–31. 
 39  See e.g., About NYPD, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/a 
bout-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (60% of New York City’s 
uniformed officers, approximately 21,600 officers, are assigned to patrol); City of Chicago 
Active Employees Overview, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://informationportal.igchicago.org/ci 
ty-of-chicago-active-employees/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (60% of Chicago’s uniformed 
officers, approximately 7,166 officers, are assigned to patrol); Fort Wayne Police Department 
Annual Report: 2018 A Year in Review, FORT WAYNE POLICE DEP’T, http://www.fwpd.org/w 
p-content/uploads/2019/03/2018-FWPD-Annual-Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (60% 
of officers of Fort Wayne, Indiana police force, approximately 286 offices, are assigned to 
patrol); Timothy Gauerke et al., Milwaukee Police Department 2016 Annual Report, 
MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T, https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/mpdAuthors/A 
rchive-Annual-Reports/2016SinglePageAnnualFinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (60% of 
Milwaukee’s police force, approximately 720 officers, are assigned to patrol duties); FORT 
WAYNE POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.fwpd.org/inside-the-fwpd/divisions/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2020); MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT: POLICE DISTRICTS, https://city.milwaukee. 
gov/Directory/police/Police-Districts.htm#.XTnL6HdFxPY (last visited Feb. 25, 2020). 
 40  Robots are also replacing human officers in other routine tasks, such as traffic 
management or crowd control, which free up law enforcement resources for more 
sophisticated work. 
 41  See Gettinger & Michel, supra note 13. 
 42  A police aerial drone in Wisconsin as able to find the body of a man who went missing 
while ice fishing; as it flew over the lake, its thermal images detected the heat signature of his 
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hiding in the woods.43  Robots that are equipped with near-infrared lenses or 
sensors can detect sound outside the range of human ears, or identify trace 
elements of explosives or narcotics.44  Patrolling robots equipped with 
millimeter wave scanners similar to what the TSA uses at airports45 will be 
able to see underneath a person’s clothing and identify what they are carrying 
in their pockets.46  And like the police robots in China and Dubai,47 police 
robots with facial recognition software will be able to look for a match 
between the individuals they encounter and the images in a database of 
individuals with outstanding warrants.48 
Meanwhile, a robot’s memory capacity is far more accurate and long-
lasting than human memories; everything that a police robot sees and hears 
will be recorded and stored, allowing for perfect recall for later investigations 
and trials.  We are already seeing this benefit from the spread of police body 
 
body below the ice.  Police Use Thermal Imaging Drone to Find Ice Fisher’s Body, CHANNEL 
3000 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.channel3000.com/news/police-use-thermal-imaging-
drone-to-find-ice-fishers-body/292377183 (last updated Dec. 27, 2019). 
 43  Sharon Cummings, Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office Uses Drone to Find Runaways, 
MYARKLAMISS.COM (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.myarklamiss.com/news/local-news/bossier 
-parish-sheriffs-office-uses-drone-to-find-runaways/.  As the sheriff in this case noted: 
“Having these drones is a priority . . . .  [W]e have the ability to launch a drone and 
immediately locate people . . . .  Our next case might be finding a lost child, looking for an 
elderly person who has wandered off, or searching for an armed robbery suspect.  We will be 
ready . . . and we will find you.”  Id. 
 44  See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 32–33. 
 45  See, e.g., Jack Stewart, Super-Fast Airport Scanners Are Coming—Eventually, WIRED 
(Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/super-fast-airport-scanners/ (describing 
scanners that “can ‘see’ through clothes, ignore skin, and red-flag suspicious shapes and 
objects”). 
 46  Of course, human police officers could also be equipped with many of these devices, 
but they might be unwieldy or impractical for a human officer to carry, particularly for an 
officer on foot patrol.  The constitutionality of using these surveillance devices is discussed 
infra at notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
 47  See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 48  Currently the United States has about 117 million people in facial recognition 
databases, and police use it to scan CCTV footage for suspects.  Countries like China, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom have also experimented with using facial recognition technology for 
police surveillance.  Under the best conditions, the best systems have an error rate of 0.2%, 
but in the real world many are still not very accurate; a recent experiment in the United 
Kingdom resulted in 2,755 false positives out of 2,900 potential matches.  Ian Sample, What 
Is Facial Recognition—And How Sinister Is It?, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/29/what-is-facial-recognition-and-how-
sinister-is-it.  In order to create reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, the technology would 
not have to be 100% accurate; as long as it could correctly identify fugitives around 30% of 
the time, it would probably satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.  See RIC SIMMONS, 
SMART SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 73–83 (Cambridge Press 2019) (examining surveys of judges to determine the level 
of probability necessary to satisfy reasonable suspicion).   
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cameras,49 and it will only accelerate as robot police officers become more 
numerous.50 
Another less intuitive benefit of police robots is their flexibility.  When 
substantive or procedural laws change, police officers need to be re-trained 
and sometimes need to learn new protocols and procedures (as well as un-
learn others that they have been using for years or even decades).  Police 
robots can simply be re-programmed to comply with the new rules.  For 
example, if a jurisdiction legalizes marijuana, or a state supreme court 
changes the law on police conduct during seizures, human police officers 
may need time and practice to change their behaviors accordingly, while a 
robot can be updated to ensure it follows the new law right away.  Or, on a 
more localized level, police robots can be designed or programmed to be as 
intrusive or as non-intrusive as a community wants them to be.  If the local 
community wants to crack down on gun crimes or drug crimes, then the 
police could lease robots with enhanced surveillance capabilities to detect 
those specific types of contraband.  Similarly, if a local community is less 
concerned about crime control and more concerned about privacy rights, the 
police department could program those same robots to not engage in 
advanced surveillance techniques. 
A final benefit, which is also related to increased capability, is the 
durability and—to put it bluntly—expendability of police robots.  Deploying 
a robot instead of a human police officer in potentially dangerous situations 
will enhance officer safety.  Police departments have been using bomb-
disposal robots for decades in order to protect human police officers from 
the inherent dangers of those situations.51  As noted earlier, many of these 
bomb-disposal robots are also used for other purposes, allowing police to 
respond to locations and situations that would be inaccessible or dangerous 
for a human officer.52  For example, officers in La Crosse, Wisconsin were 
 
 49  See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might 
Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 964, 966–69 (2016). 
 50  A related benefit is that any police abuse or Fourth Amendment violations that are 
committed by robot police officers (usually by direction from their human pilots) will be 
recorded and stored for use as evidence against the police.  See id. at 968–70.   
 51  These robots are relatively agile, usually with multiple sets of caterpillar tracks or six 
or more wheels.  Peter Ray Allison, What Does a Bomb Disposal Robot Actually Do?, BBC 
FUTURE (July 15, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160714-what-does-a-bomb-
disposal-robot-actually-do.  They are equipped with sophisticated cameras and arms so that 
the human operator can manipulate objects or pick them up and carry them.  Kathy Marks, 
Robotics for Bomb Squads, TACTICAL RESPONSE (Jan./Feb. 2012), http://www.hendonpub.co 
m/resources/article_archive/results/details?id=1102 [https://web.archive.org/web/201710150 
34530/www.hendonpub.com/resources/article_archive/results/details?id=1102].   
 52  Most robot policing devices that interact directly with the community focus on 
“intense” situations such as bomb detection and deployment or entry into structures with an 
active shooter.  See April Glaser, 11 Police Robots Patrolling Around the World, WIRED (July 
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executing an arrest warrant in a home and believed the suspect was hiding in 
the crawlspace.53  They sent their robot into the crawlspace and quickly 
located the man, who soon surrendered and emerged voluntarily when the 
police sent a drug dog in after him.54  Internationally, remote-control drones 
armed with pepper spray, tear gas, and paintballs are used for riot control, a 
job which is especially dangerous for human police officers.55 
Even routine tasks like traffic stops have the potential to be dangerous 
or even deadly for human police officers and the civilian drivers that are 
pulled over.56  A new type of robot now in development deploys from an 
officer’s police car after the officer pulls over a vehicle for a traffic 
infraction.57  The robot conducts the traffic stop remotely, allowing the 
officer to stay safely in his or her car and communicate with the driver 
through video phone, thus eliminating the danger of a violent confrontation 
that could result in injury or death to the officer or the driver.58 
The potential disadvantages of widespread police robots are the flip 
side of the benefits.  The greater efficiency of robots raises the possibility 
that the surveillance state will grow even more powerful, with cities 
purchasing hundreds of aerial drones and robot police officers to constantly 
 
24, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/07/11-police-robots-patrolling-around-world; Mike 
Thomas, Police Robots: What They Are & How They’re Used, BUILT IN (May 30, 2019), 
https://builtin.com/robotics/police-robot-law-enforcement; see also supra notes 18–21 and 
accompanying text. 
 53   See La Crosse Police Use Robot, K-9 Arrest Man Hiding in Crawl Space, NEWS 8000 
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.news8000.com/news/crime/la-crosse-police-k-9-arrest-man-
hiding-in-crawl-space/1039770684. 
 54  Id. 
 55  In India, police in the Uttar Pradash region purchased “Skunk drones,” which can 
release tear gas and fire up to twenty paintballs per second.  The drones also have bright strobe 
lights and lasers to help disperse crowds, speakers that allow police to communicate with the 
crowds, and a camera, a thermal camera, and microphone for surveillance.  Glaser, supra note 
52. 
 56  In 2015, over one hundred people were shot and killed by police after a traffic stop.  
Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal Traffic Stops, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-disproportionate-number-
of-black-victims-in-fatal-traffic-stops/2015/12/24/c29717e2-a344-11e5-9c4e-
be37f66848bb_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2dfb79bd938d.  While in 2018, two 
police officers were killed while conducting traffic stops.  FBI Releases 2018 Statistics on 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty, FBI (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2018-statistics-on-law-
enforcement-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty. 
 57  See Peter Holley, One Solution for Keeping Traffic Stops from Turning Violent: A 
Robot That Separates Police Officers from Drivers, WASH. POST (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/14/one-solution-keeping-traffic-
stops-turning-violent-robot-that-separates-police-officers-
drivers/?utm_term=.47b1bba53fc9.  
 58  Id. 
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patrol the skies and the streets.59  If current trends continue, this increased 
amount of surveillance will fall disproportionally on poor and minority 
populations, who live in so-called “high crime” neighborhoods, raise their 
families in public housing, and attend inner-city public schools.60  
Furthermore, the formidable data collection and retention capabilities of 
police robots could imbue them with an unrealistic veneer of infallibility in 
the minds of judges and juries, who may not accurately evaluate the dangers 
of data manipulation and tampering that exist with any type of machine-
generated evidence.61 
Finally, there is also an Orwellian feel to a world in which law 
enforcement robots patrol the street; such a development will create further 
distance, both literally and figuratively, between the human police and the 
neighborhoods they are policing.  Judge Michael Sinclair notes that a robot 
police force will be ill-equipped to conduct community policing and other 
forms of human interaction, since “robots, remotely-operated or otherwise, 
will almost certainly be less capable than humans in this regard.”62 
D.  The Capabilities of Robot Police to Search, Seize, and Arrest 
Suspects 
Robot police not only face challenges in forging a personal connection 
with those that they encounter; they also have limited capabilities to 
physically interact with suspects.  Aerial drones and bomb-disposal devices 
are not designed for that kind of work, and even the existing private security 
robots can do little more than approach a suspect to allow the human pilot to 
speak with him. 
 
 59  There is a parallel to the concern that people have over introducing machines to the 
military—if war becomes too cheap and involves less risk to human lives, there is less of a 
deterrent to going to war.  Similarly, if robotic police officers make surveillance inexpensive 
and remove any risk of injury or death to police officers, there is a danger that the losing these 
natural checks and limits will result in over-surveillance by the police. 
 60  Professor Bennett Capers argues that the use of certain types of surveillance 
technology will actually equalize privacy costs felt by all Americans.  See Bennett Capers, 
Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017).  This is probably true for the 
kinds of technology that he discusses in his article, such as public surveillance cameras, big 
data analysis, and gun detectors.  Robot police officers certainly will deploy these tools.  But 
if police departments are simply given the ability to double the number of police officers that 
they can deploy, it seems likely they will continue with their established resource allocation 
patterns. 
 61  In a more subtle way, the use of evidence gathered by police robots could change the 
way defense attorneys do their job; instead of building reasonable doubt based on cross-
examining police officers and challenging the credibility of eyewitnesses, defense attorneys 
will be more likely to rely on experts to testify that the robot’s detection devices were not 
properly calibrated or that the machine-collected data was not properly safeguarded after it 
was collected. 
 62  Sinclair, supra note 6, at 38. 
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With today’s technology, however, robot policer officers could be 
designed to conduct a Terry stop and even effectuate an arrest.63  In order to 
detain a suspect, a robot (or the human pilot controlling the robot) merely 
needs to order the suspect to stand still—if the suspect complies, the robot 
will have successfully conducted a Terry stop.64  Although the suspect could 
choose to ignore the command and flee from the robot officer, this will likely 
not happen very often; the suspect will know that his face has been captured 
and recorded by the robot’s cameras, and he will be committing a crime 
simply by refusing to comply with a lawful order.65  Furthermore, the robot 
officer would follow the suspect and broadcast the location of the suspect to 
human police officers, and the suspect’s face would be added to the database 
of individuals who are wanted for a crime.  Thus, most suspects who 
disobeyed this order would eventually be caught and prosecuted.66 
A robot designed with the ability to use non-lethal force could 
physically detain suspects, either to effectuate an arrest or to conduct a Terry 
stop.  The robot could order the suspect to put his hands into restraints 
attached to the robot, and if a suspect refused to comply with a robot’s order 
to stop or use the restraints, the robot could deploy devices such as pepper 
 
 63  Robots will also conduct searches when they are asked to execute search warrants or 
arrest warrants.  Pursuant to a warrant, an aerial surveillance drone could be ordered to fly 
over a suspect’s backyard to record what it sees.  Pursuant to an arrest warrant, a remote-
controlled or semi-autonomous robot could be sent into a home to conduct an initial search or 
sweep before the officers enter—or to effectuate the entire arrest and escort the suspect out of 
the house if the suspect is cooperative.  
  As noted above, we are here only discussing semi-autonomous robots, which can 
perform some functions (such as routine patrol and identification of suspicious situations) on 
their own, but which would be controlled by a human pilot at the time of a search, detention, 
or use of force.  Therefore, we are not concerned (at this time) with how a robot officer would 
decide on its own when to conduct a search, when to detain, or when to use force. 
 64  See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (submission to lawful authority 
constitutes a stop). 
 65  Failure to comply with an order to stop pursuant to Terry constitutes obstructing 
official business or a similar crime.  See, e.g., State v. Newsome, No. 17CA2, 2017 WL 
3912980, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017) (fleeing from a Terry stop constitutes 
obstructing official business under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.31); People v. Marlow, No. 
315166, 2014 WL 2935946, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 26, 2014) (failure to comply with 
lawful Terry command constitutes obstruction under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81d); C.E.L. 
v. State, 995 So.2d 558, 562 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (fleeing from police and ignoring a 
lawful command to stop constitutes obstructing justice). 
 66  This model of Terry stops—relying on lawful authority backed up by the threat of 
prosecution—would shift from a policing model based on physical compulsion to one based 
on legal compulsion.  When combined with hundreds of robots patrolling the streets with 
cameras, as well as thousands of CCTV cameras in public places, it will represent a trade-off, 
in which we choose to live in a world where police officers almost never touch us, and 
violence between police and civilians becomes vanishingly small, but police almost always 
know who and where we are when we are out in public.  The result would be an increase in 
physical security and autonomy but a decrease in privacy.   
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spray or conducted electrical weapons to incapacitate the suspect until 
human police officers arrive. 
Once the robot officer had successfully detained the suspect, it could 
question the suspect further (as part of a Terry stop), or, if the human pilot 
determined that probable cause existed, it could place the suspect under 
arrest or hold the suspect until a human officer arrived to place him under 
arrest.67 
Police robots could also conduct searches.  A robot that conducted a 
traffic stop could, if the driver consents or the human pilot determines there 
is probable cause, look inside the interior of a car.  These robots could also 
be designed with Breathalyzers to check blood alcohol levels.  Patrol robots 
could also—as directed by their human pilots—order suspects to take actions 
that would reveal information.  A robot conducting a Terry stop could order 
a suspect to turn out his pockets, open his jacket, or lift up his shirt.  Robots 
could order suspects to open briefcases or backpacks, or if the suspect was 
uncooperative, the robot could use an appendage to physically open the 
container.68  As noted above, the robots could also be equipped with 
millimeter wave scanners to obtain images of the items that the suspect is 
carrying underneath his clothes, inside his pockets, or within his bags.69 
 
III. HOW ROBOT POLICE OFFICERS WILL CHANGE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE 
The conventional wisdom is that robot police officers will increase the 
efficiency of law enforcement agencies, but will also bring increased threats 
to our privacy.  Professor Melanie Reid raises eight issues posed by robot 
police officers, including the fact that “[r]obots will intrude on citizens’ right 
to privacy more often than human officers as they will have access to more 
third[-]party data in a shorter period of time,” and “[r]obots will have less 
people skills and common sense than human officers, and it is unclear how 
they will handle tense situations.”70  On the other hand, Professor Reid 
 
 67  A more sophisticated robot could actually grab onto a suspect and handcuff him, but 
current models of law enforcement robots do not have this capability. 
 68  For example, the AVATAR Extended Manipulator Arm, manufactured by RoboteX, 
can pick up small objects and open knob handle doors.  Avatar Accessories, ROBOTEX, 
https://robotex.com/products/avatar-accessories (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
 69  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 70  Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Supercomputers, 
Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 867–68 (2017).  Professor Reid’s 
eight issues are the following:  
(1) Robots will be smarter, faster, and more efficient than human officers[;]  
(2) Robots will intrude on citizens’ right to privacy more often than human 
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predicts that robot police officers will streamline the process of applying for 
a warrant, which will probably lead officers to seek warrants more often—
although even then she worries that warrants may not “serve the same 
integrity check on police if they are easier to draft, send to a judge, and 
approve electronically.”71 
But the increased efficiency and potential threats to privacy that 
Professor Reid discusses will come about with or without robot police 
officers.  In fact, these developments are already occurring: modern human 
police officers use computers that can instantaneously access third-party 
data, and electronic search warrants are now common in many 
jurisdictions.72  And although modern surveillance technology, such as video 
cameras, thermal imagers, or backscatter scans do create new Fourth 
Amendment challenges,73 they are also not unique to robots, since human 
police officers are already using these technologies to varying degrees. 
The unique aspect of robot police officers that profoundly changes the 
nature of police/civilian interactions is their ability to insulate human police 
officers from danger.  As we will see below, this feature of robot police 
officers challenges the fundamental assumptions of two Fourth Amendment 
doctrines: the Terry line of cases that give police broad powers to conduct 
searches, and the rules governing police use of force. 
 
officers as they will have access to more third[-]party data in a shorter period 
of time[;]  
(3) Robot capabilities will require a complete rethinking of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine based upon the amount of information they will access on a daily 
basis[;]  
(4) Free-thinking robots will require human intervention and supervision[;]  
(5) Robots and human officers may follow the same laws but use different 
standards to arrest people, i.e., inflexible programming versus discretion[;]  
(6) Robots will have less people skills and common sense than human officers, 
and it is unclear how they will handle tense situations[;]  
(7) The community will perceive robo-cops differently than human officers[; 
and]  
(8) Robots should be treated identically to their human counterparts when it 
comes to law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment, e.g., motions to 
suppress evidence filed on the basis of a robot’s action (or omission), or 
suspects filing abuse of civil rights claims against a robo-cop while in 
performance of its duties. 
Id. at 867–68. 
 71  Id. at 874. 
 72  See, e.g., H. Morley Swingle & Lane P. Thomasson, Beam Me Up: Upgrading Search 
Warrants with Technology, 69 J. MO. B. 16, 18–20 (2013) (“With e-mail, officers can get 
search warrants quickly without leaving the crime scene.”).  
 73  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (discussing the constitutionality 
of thermal imagers used on a home); Henderson, supra note 49, at 964, 966–68 (discussing 
the Fourth Amendment issues raised by police body cameras). 
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A.  The Expansive Powers Granted by the “Officer Safety” Rationale 
1.  Terry v. Ohio 
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court revolutionized Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in Terry v. Ohio.74  Terry gives a police officer 
the right to forcibly detain an individual for a brief period of time if the 
officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity.75  This “stop and inquire” power granted by Terry was the less 
controversial aspect of the opinion; even the defendant in Terry conceded 
that the police had to have some ability to investigate when they observed 
suspicious activity.76  The Terry Court could have stopped there, and allowed 
police to conduct a stop but no frisk; a police officer who had reasonable 
suspicion would order a suspect to stop, ask him some questions, and detain 
him for a minute or two without ever physically touching him.  These stops 
would no doubt represent a significant inconvenience to the suspect, and 
many suspects would feel harassed by the police.  But the degree of indignity 
and loss of privacy would be orders of magnitude less than it would be for 
those who are subjected to a frisk.77 
 
 74  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 75  Id. at 24 (“When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or 
to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take 
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm.”).  
 76  Id. at 25 (“Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from making 
any investigation of suspicious circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to 
make an arrest.”). 
 77  The Terry Court acknowledged the serious intrusion caused by a frisk: “[I]t is simply 
fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen 
stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’  It is a 
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”  Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted); see 
also id. at 24–25.  “Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a 
severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an 
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”  Id.  The Terry Court makes no 
such declarations regarding the intrusiveness or humiliation of the stop aspect of the 
procedure.   
  The indignities suffered by subjects of a Terry frisk are well documented in more recent 
studies of the procedure.  In a 2012 report, the Center for Constitutional Rights investigated 
the dramatic increase in Terry stops in New York City.  While some of the societal and 
psychological damage caused by the practice was linked to the sheer number of stops and the 
evidence that the police were engaging in racial profiling, the majority of the harm caused by 
the procedure was linked to the frisking procedure.  The report catalogues abuses of the frisk 
doctrine, including “being forcibly stripped to . . . underclothes in public, inappropriate 
touching, physical violence and threats, extortion of sex, sexual harassment[,] and other 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”  See Stop and Frisk: The Human Impact, CTR. FOR 
CONST. RTS. 5 (July 2012), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-
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Of course, that is not the actual world we live in, because the second 
half of the Terry holding authorizes police to conduct a brief search incident 
to the stop.78  As the Terry Court recognized, the propriety of the frisk 
conducted by the police officer was the critical aspect of the case.79  But in 
approving of the frisk, the Court stated that the frisk itself is merely 
tangential to the stop.80  It is not part of the investigation that is based on 
reasonable suspicion; it is a necessary evil that is required so that the police 
officers can safely conduct the field interrogation, and (in theory) it is only 
allowed if the officer has “reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed 
and dangerous individual.”81  Thus, in a context where there is no concern 
for the protection of the police officer—for example, if there is no human 
police officer present at the stop—the justification for the Terry frisk 
disappears. 
Under Terry, a police officer is only legally authorized to conduct a 
frisk if the officer reasonably believes a suspect is armed and poses a 
physical threat to the officer.82  But in the decades since Terry, courts have 
been extremely deferential to police officers who conduct Terry frisks.  In 
some cases, the factors supporting the frisk seem reasonable: the police 
officer has reason to believe the suspect is planning a robbery,83 or the police 
officer received a tip that the individual was carrying a firearm.84  But in 
other cases, the courts treat the right to frisk as almost automatic following a 
legitimate stop.  In Illinois v. Wardlow, for example, the police saw the 
suspect standing in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the 
 
human-impact-report.pdf.  Even when the police do not abuse their authority during a frisk, 
the touching and squeezing of the suspect’s body which is authorized by Terry is a degrading 
experience that violates the suspect’s bodily integrity. 
 78  Terry, 392 U.S at 27.  
 79  “The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking 
steps to investigate petitioner’s suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification 
for McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for weapons in the 
course of that investigation.”  Id. at 23. 
 80  Id. at 26 (“An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to 
vindicate society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by 
future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or 
conviction ultimately follows.  The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, 
constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”).  
 81  Id.  This is a different and distinct standard than what is required to authorize a stop. 
 82  Id. at 27. (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of 
case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that 
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable 
cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”) 
 83  Id. at 27–28.  
 84  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1972). 
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suspect fled when he saw the police.85  The police officer conducted a Terry 
stop and a frisk because “in his experience[,] it was common for there to be 
weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions.”86  The Supreme Court 
explicitly upheld the stop after conducting an analysis of the factors that led 
to the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in criminal 
activity, but never discussed whether the officer had reason to believe the 
suspect was armed, thus implicitly approving of the frisk with no evidence 
of dangerousness.87 
Lower courts have been even more willing to approve of frisks, and 
they have expanded the range of suspected crimes that give police officers 
an automatic right to frisk.88  Writing twenty-six years after Terry was 
decided, Professor David A. Harris reviewed hundreds of stop-and-frisk 
decisions by lower courts.89  He determined that many courts automatically 
allowed frisks for any narcotics trafficker, and some courts permitted an 
automatic frisk for the purchaser in a drug transaction.90  Many courts also 
often automatically approve of frisks of burglary suspects, on the theory that 
burglars “often carry screwdrivers and or other tools that they might use as 
weapons.”91  Some courts also automatically allow a frisk of any companion 
of an arrestee, any individual present when a search warrant is executed, any 
individual who is placed in a squad car during a Terry stop, and any time the 
police officers are outnumbered or in a high-crime area.92 
It is also easy for police officers to characterize relatively innocuous 
behavior by the defendant as indicating the suspect is armed and dangerous, 
including moving his hands under his coat93 or appearing nervous when the 
 
 85  528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000). 
 86  Id. at 122. 
 87  Id. at 124–26. 
 88  See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1994) (“Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s instructions, lower courts 
allow frisks automatically—categorically—in many situations in which the offense suspected 
does not require a weapon, and the suspect shows no outward sign he might be armed and 
dangerous.”). 
 89  Id. at 22–32. 
 90  Id. at 25–26. 
 91  Id. at 27. 
 92  Id. at 28–32.  Professor Harris concludes his overview of the lower court cases by 
noting that “[m]any . . . lower court decisions on frisks have moved toward one goal: allowing 
police to make more frisks by assuming that more and more crimes, persons, and situations 
could present danger to officers, when in fact they may not.  The result has been a steady 
progression toward a point at which anyone, anytime, may be searched if they are stopped, 
with no limits on police discretion.”  Id. at 52. 
 93  In re D.E.W., 612 A.2d. 194, 195 (D.C. 1992). 
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officer approaches.94  Professors Harris and David Rudovsky note that many 
of these factors are not in fact indicative of possession of a weapon: 
The data show that certain factors regularly reported by police, 
such as observation of a “bulge,” a suspect not being cooperative, 
a suspect having their hands in their pockets, presence in a high-
crime neighborhood, acting nervous or making furtive 
movements, and “flight” are poor predictors of whether one is 
armed and dangerous, yet the courts have regularly credited these 
explanations in sustaining police frisks.  In almost all cases, 
“‘bulges’ turn out to be cell phones or wallets,” and the other 
triggering factors are also very weak indicators of criminal 
activity.  Thus, in audits conducted in 2014–2016, of 220 frisks 
based on a “bulge,” only one weapon was seized, a hit rate of less 
than 0.5%.95 
These broad standards mean that in reality, many Terry stops are 
accompanied by frisks, although the number seems to vary widely from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.96 
The open secret is that police officers routinely use Terry frisks as a 
way to search for evidence, or—more subversively—as a way to assert 
control and dominance over an individual or a neighborhood.97  The courts 
 
 94  State v. Matthew David S., 205 W.Va. 392, 396 (1999). 
 95  David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of 
Common Sense in World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 541–42 (2018) (citations 
omitted). 
 96  For example, in New York City 66% of stops lead to frisks, while in Seattle only 
21.8% of stops lead to frisks.  See Stop-and-Frisk in the De Blasio Era (2019), NYCLU (Mar. 
14, 2019), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/stop-and-frisk-de-blasio-era-2019; 
SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, STOPS AND DETENTIONS ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018), https://www.seatt 
le.gov/Documents/Departments/Police/Reports/2017-Stops-and-Detentions-Final.pdf. 
In Boston, about 40% of stops lead to a frisk.  JEFFERY FAGAN ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF RACE 
AND ETHNICITY PATTERNS IN BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIELD INTERROGATIONS, 
OBSERVATION, FRISK, AND/OR SEARCH REPORTS 3 (June 15, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com 
/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2158964/full-boston-police-analysis-on-race-and-ethnicit 
y.pdf.  While Philadelphia, when operating under a consent decree, saw its frisk rate drop to 
17% of all stops.  Plaintiff’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 
9, Bailey v. Philadelphia, (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 10-5952).  These numbers are hard to come 
by; some cities refuse to collect data on their stop-and-frisk practices, while the collection 
practices of other cities have been strongly criticized as inaccurate.  See NEAR Act Stop and 
Frisk Data Collection, ACLU (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.acludc.org/en/news/near-act-
stop-frisk-data-collection; Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance of Open 
Police Data, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/02/st 
op-and-frisk-in-4-cities-the-importance-of-open-police-data-2. 
 97  The class action litigation challenging the aggressive stop-and-frisk policies in New 
York City provided some colorful evidence that police use Terry stops and frisks to establish 
control and dominance in the neighborhood.  For example, during a roll call in 2008, a police 
officer Lieutenant gave the following speech to his officers: 
All right, I went out there [to Howard and Chauncey] yesterday and . . . we’ve 
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have been complicit in this practice because they are reluctant to second-
guess police officers who legitimately face real dangers in their jobs.  On one 
level, this deference is understandable: judges will be disinclined to overrule 
an officer’s decision in the field regarding physical safety, and no judge 
wants to set rules that make the police officer’s job unreasonably 
dangerous.98  Furthermore, police officers have a specialized expertise in 
identifying dangerous individuals and dangerous situations; as the Supreme 
Court has noted: “the evidence thus collected [in support of reasonable 
suspicion] must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement.”99  But data suggests that police officers conduct frisks more 
often than the Terry standard should allow, since the hit rates for these frisks 
are extremely low.  Over the course of the millions of frisks conducted by 
the NYPD in the early 2000s, only 1.5% of the frisks revealed a weapon;100 
 
got the old man out there with the grey hairs.  A loud mouth.  He thinks since 
he’s 55 years old he’s not going to get locked up.  Well, guess what?  I don’t 
tolerate shit out there.  He went in and two of his pals went in.  All right?  So 
we’ve got to keep the corner clear . . . .  Because if you get too big of a crowd 
there, you know . . . they’re going to think that they own the block.  We own 
the block.  They don’t own the block, all right?  They might live there but we 
own the block.  All right?  We own the streets here.  You tell them what to do. 
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
  The Terry Court itself recognized that this was a danger when they initially authorized 
these searches back in 1968, quoting a report from a Presidential task force that noted that 
aggressive use of frisks during what was then known as “field interrogations” was inevitably 
“a severely exacerbating factor in police-community tensions.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
14–15 n.11.  The Court quoted further from the report: “This is particularly true in situations 
where the ‘stop and frisk’ of youths or minority group members is ‘motivated by the officers’ 
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes 
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.”  
Id. 
 98  In Terry and in a number of subsequent cases interpreting Terry, the Supreme Court 
cites statistics about the number of police officers killed in the line of duty.  See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 24 n.21 (noting that 57 law enforcement officers were killed in 1966, and 335 were 
killed in the seven-year period between 1960 and 1966); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
148 n.3 (1972) (noting that 125 policemen were murdered in 1971, with all but five of them 
killed by gunshots).  Lower courts have also cited these statistics.  See United States v. 
Micheletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The number of police officers killed annually 
in the line of duty has tripled since Terry was decided; the numbers of those assaulted and 
wounded have risen by a factor of twenty”); State v. McGill, 609 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. 
2000) (“Although the number of officers killed in the line of duty has increased only slightly 
[since the Terry decision] (61 officers killed in 1998), the number of assaults on officers has 
more than doubled (59,545 line-of-duty assaults in 1998).”). 
 99  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
 100  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 558. 
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likewise, between 2012–2016 the Philadelphia police found weapons in only 
1% of their frisks.101 
None of these critiques of Terry are new, of course, but solutions to this 
problem have been elusive.  Occasionally, the Department of Justice or city 
residents will sue a city, arguing that the city’s stop-and-frisk practices 
violate the residents’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.  
This tactic has had mixed success.  A Philadelphia lawsuit led to a consent 
decree in 2011 in which a court monitored the police use of stop-and-frisk 
tactics.102  After four years, the court found that 56% of all frisks that 
occurred in 2015 lacked reasonable suspicion or occurred after a stop that 
lacked reasonable suspicion.103  In 2016, this number was only down to 41% 
of all frisks;104 by 2018, it was still at 30% of all frisks.105  Sometimes the 
police react to these consent decrees with a “pullback”—a deliberate under-
enforcement of the criminal code, with disastrous results.106  In Baltimore, 
for example, prosecutors charged six officers with murder and related 
charges following the 2015 death of Freddie Gray in the back of a police van; 
in 2016, the city entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice 
that, among other things, set new rules on the stop-and-frisk practices.107  
Law enforcement officers responded by ceasing nearly all proactive policing 
activity, with predictable results: crime rose dramatically in the city, with 
homicides climbing from 197 in 2011 to 342 in 2017.108  A similar situation 
 
 101  See Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 95, at 541 n.253 (2018) (citing Plaintiffs’ Seventh 
Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at 19, 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2017) (No. 10-5952); Plaintiffs’ Sixth Report 
to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at 19, Bailey v. 
City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2016) (No. 10-5952); Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to 
Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 17, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 10-5952)). 
 102  Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 95, at 536. 
 103  Id.  
 104  Id.  
 105  Plaintiffs’ Ninth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 17, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2018) (No. 10-5952). 
 106  This phenomenon is also known as “depolicing,” the “ACLU effect,” or “the Ferguson 
effect.”   
 107  Alec MacGillis, The Tragedy of Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (March 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/magazine/baltimore-tragedy-crime.html. 
 108  Id.  Baltimore police officers routinely reported that they believed the consent decree 
prevented them from effectively engaging with the community.  One veteran police officer 
described the mixed messages he believed he was receiving: “Go out and stop crime, but don’t 
hurt anyone’s feelings,” and “Be aggressive—but not too aggressive.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  A survey of Baltimore police officers in 2019 said that 74% of officers felt 
“restricted” by the consent decree, and 43% did not feel comfortable making self-initiated 
arrests.  One officer in the survey noted “[s]top-and-frisk was a very, very good tool in 
preventing shootings and other crimes.  Bring the old style of policing back and let us do our 
job.”  Jayne Miller, Survey Finds Baltimore Police Officers Feel Restricted by Consent 
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unfolded in Chicago, which entered into an agreement with the ACLU 
following the shooting of Laquan Donald.109  As a result, police stops 
plummeted from an average of around 60,000 per month in 2014–2015 to an 
average of around 10,000 per month in early 2016.110  At the same time, the 
homicide rate in Chicago skyrocketed from an annual average of between 
400–500 homicides from 2007–2015 to 750 in 2016.111  Professors Paul 
Cassell and Richard Fowles conducted a regression analysis of the possible 
causes of this spike in homicides and concluded that there was a “very strong, 
statistically significant” link between the decline in stop-and-frisks and the 
increase in fatal and non-fatal shootings.112  Further analysis of seventeen 
cities showed that cities with consent decrees had violent crime rates that 
were 2.6% higher and property crime rates that were 6.9% higher than the 
national average.113 
The Terry doctrine thus presents us with something of a paradox.  On 
the one hand, police officers are routinely abusing the doctrine by conducting 
frisks in situations in which there is no reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
is armed, and courts, for the most part, are allowing them to do so.  On the 
other hand, attempts to rein in the overuse of the frisk procedure are either 
ineffective or lead to pushback from the police, who believe that their safety 
is at risk if they are not given broad latitude to conduct frisks. 
The introduction of robot police officers would immediately change the 
legal and practical landscape for Terry stops.  The legal justification for 
frisks has always been based primarily on officer protection.  A robot could 
conduct every aspect of a Terry stop—including the detention and the 
questioning that is necessary to confirm or allay the reasonable suspicion—
 
Decree, WBALTV (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/consent-decree-police-
officer-survey/26361081. 
  Other cities have had more success with consent decrees.  Chicago entered into an 
agreement with the ACLU following the shooting of Laquan Donald, and police stops 
plummeted from an average of around 60,000 per month in 2014–2015 to an average of 
around 10,000 per month in early 2016.  See Shaila Dewan, Deconstructing the “Ferguson 
Effect,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/us/politics/f 
erguson-effect.html. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Paul S. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike? 
An Empirical Examination of the “ACLU Effect” and the Role of Stop and Frisks in 
Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1581, 1586–87 (2018). 
 112  Id. at 1615. 
 113  Id. at 1612.  The study did not include Chicago or New York.  New York City appears 
to be a glaring exception to the depolicing effect: between 2011 and 2015, it saw a 95% drop 
in stop-and-frisks as a result of class action litigation and a new policy put in place by a newly 
elected mayor, but this dramatic drop in stop-and-frisks coincided with a stable homicide rate.  
Id. at 1609. 
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without putting a human police officer in any danger, and thus without 
triggering the need for a frisk.  Thus, under current doctrine, a robot would 
never be legally permitted to conduct a frisk during a Terry stop. 
The repercussions of this could be far reaching.  The most obvious 
result would be the elimination of frisks as part of the everyday interaction 
between police officers and suspects.  This would reduce the level of privacy 
intrusion, intimidation, and humiliation that now often occurs with Terry 
stops.  Not incidentally, it will also eliminate the danger that police officers 
legitimately fear when they conduct a Terry stop—the danger that led to the 
justification of frisks in the first place. 
Another effect would be a dramatic decrease, if not outright 
elimination, of pretextual Terry stops.  Police sometimes conduct a Terry 
stop not because they want to stop and inquire about potential criminal 
activity, but because they want to conduct a search for weapons or drugs.  
The reasonable suspicion standard is relatively low, and courts tend to be 
deferential to the expertise of police officers who use vague terms such as 
“furtive movement” or “looking nervous” to meet Terry’s specific and 
articulable facts requirement.114  This creates an incentive for police officers 
to use Terry stops to search for drugs or weapons.  Since robot police officers 
would not have that legal authority, police using these devices would be 
unlikely to waste their time stopping a suspect and asking him questions 
unless the officer truly believed the questions could uncover evidence of 
criminal activity. 
Not only will the pretextual Terry stops decrease, the overall hit rate of 
the remaining stops will likely increase.  This is true for two reasons.  First, 
the human officers monitoring a robot’s outputs will be able to conduct a 
much more thorough pre-stop investigation.  Currently, if an officer sees a 
suspect make a suspicious movement—stuffing what might be a gun into his 
pocket, or handing over what might be a packet of drugs—the officer must 
rely on her split-second observation in order to decide whether reasonable 
suspicion exists.  The human officers monitoring the robot officers will be 
able to replay the suspicious movement, slow it down, and enhance the image 
 
 114  See, e.g. United States v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The defendant’s 
furtive gestures in moving or leaning toward the right side of the truck—a motion which the 
officers reasonably interpreted was consistent with reaching for a weapon—compounded the 
officers’ belief that violence was imminent.”); United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 25 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (“[The officers’] suspicion was based both on the place where the meeting between 
[the defendant] and the other individual took place . . . and the unusual and furtive nature of 
the meeting.”); United States v. Tillman, 543 F. App’x 557, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[The 
defendant] disobeyed multiple commands to keep his hands visible, made two furtive 
movements, and was nervous.  His conduct, when examined cumulatively, provides an 
adequate basis to find reasonable suspicion.”). 
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to get a much better view of what actually happened.  They will also be in a 
position to use computers to cross-reference the incident with lots of other 
data—such as whether a known crack house is nearby, or whether the suspect 
has a prior criminal record for firearms possession.  Thus, the human officer 
watching the monitors back at the precinct will have more information 
available to her, and will be able to build more evidence to support her 
reasonable suspicion than if she were in the field. 
Second, as noted above,115 robot police officers have enhanced senses 
and will be able to detect the presence of contraband more easily and 
accurately than human police officers.  Robot police officers with particle 
detectors could in theory scan everyone they see on the street and alert their 
human pilots whenever contraband is detected, which could then lead to the 
human pilot initiating a Terry stop. 
Here, however, the police would need to be careful in how they 
designed the detectors on their robots.  A robot that conducted a particle 
detector scan of an individual and sent the resulting image to its human 
monitor would be conducting a search without any individualized suspicion, 
since the human monitor would see an outline of everything the individual 
was carrying in his pockets and under his clothing.  Instead, the robot would 
need to run the results of the scan through internal software that could 
identify the distinctive shape of a firearm or a vial of crack cocaine, and then 
convert that analysis to a binary result: the suspect either is or is not carrying 
contraband.  If the former, the robot alerts its human pilot, who would be 
informed that the image detectors indicated a strong chance that the 
individual is carrying contraband, thus triggering the justification for a Terry 
stop.  If the latter, the robot sends no message at all to its human monitor, 
and no human would know anything about the results of the scan.  In neither 
case would a human being ever see the actual image detected by the robot, 
since the image would almost always contain information (e.g., images of 
non-contraband items) that was protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Courts 
have routinely upheld binary searches such as this, including drug field 
tests116 and drug-sniffing dogs.117  These types of searches can only reveal 
the presence or absence of illegal activity, and individuals have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy to protect their illegal activity.118 
 
 115  See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 116  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121–22 (1984). 
 117  See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983). 
 118  See Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to 
Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 448–59 (2006). 
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The good news is that it would be relatively easy, from a legal 
standpoint, for courts to hold that a police robot’s scanning of civilians 
qualifies as a binary search in this context.  One of the obstacles in designing 
binary searches is ensuring that the dog or device that is conducting the 
surveillance is accurate enough to create a sufficiently strong presumption 
that the individual is indeed committing a crime.119  This can be challenging 
when a binary search is used to justify a search warrant or a car search, since 
those actions require the police to have probable cause to believe contraband 
is present.120  In contrast, a robot police officer conducting a binary scan 
would only have to reach the lower standard of reasonable suspicion to 
justify a Terry stop.  Thus, the software that attempted to identify the hidden 
items as contraband would not have to be as accurate as the canine sniffs that 
trigger probable cause searches—only accurate enough that it would give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual was carrying contraband. 
Widespread deployment of these robots would mean that everyone in 
public would be scanned for contraband, and anyone who was carrying 
something that strongly resembled contraband would be approached by a 
robot (which would at that point be controlled by a human) and asked a few 
questions.  This would be the equivalent of having drug dog on every street 
corner, unobtrusively sniffing everyone who passed by and barking to alert 
a nearby police officer if it detected contraband.  The result would be more 
efficient law enforcement (fewer human police deployed, greater hit rates for 
Terry stops), but an increase in passive surveillance of individuals.121  None 
of this surveillance would reveal anything to the police other than whether 
someone was breaking the law, and most people would probably be unaware 
that they were even being surveilled. 
To see how this would work in practice, consider the following 
hypothetical.  Assume the police in an urban precinct deploy twenty robot 
police officers to a four-square-mile neighborhood.  To support these robot 
 
 119  See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of 
the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 581–83 (2013). 
 120  See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243–45 (2013). 
 121  It is not clear whether this change would also involve an increase or decrease in the 
total number of Terry stops.  On the one hand, pretextual Terry stops would become much 
more rare; as noted in the text, there will be no way for police to use an unjustified stop to 
justify a frisk.  On the other hand, the greater sensory capabilities of robot police officers may 
generate legitimate reasonable suspicion more often, leading to more stops.  Currently the hit 
rate for Terry stops—the rate at which actual contraband has been found following a Terry 
stop—has been measured at 3% in Philadelphia and 14% in New York.  See Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and 
Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 3, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 
10-5952).  These are relatively low numbers, suggesting that if robots were only generating 
reasonable suspicion when there was a legitimate likelihood that a suspect was carrying 
contraband, there would not be a significant increase in the number of stops. 
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officers, the police department employs two human officers in squad cars 
patrolling the area, as well as two officers back at the precinct monitoring 
everything the robots see as they patrol the area.  The robot officers move 
randomly through the neighborhood, as human officers on foot patrol would 
have done, except the robots scan every person they see using millimeter 
wave scanners.  The output of these scanners is fed into image recognition 
software, designed to identify illegal items.122  The software is set so that if 
the software detects a greater than 50% likelihood that an individual is 
carrying contraband,123 an alert goes off at the precinct, communicating to 
one of the monitoring officers that there is at least a reasonable suspicion that 
an individual within range is committing a crime.  The robots also scan all 
of the faces that they see as they patrol and cross-reference the faces with 
images of individuals with outstanding warrants using facial recognition 
technology—again, if there is a greater than 50% chance that a match occurs, 
one of the human monitors will be alerted.  The human monitors themselves 
are also watching the visual outputs of the robots’ camera.  If one of them 
sees behavior or an interaction that gives rise to reasonable suspicion—a 
 
 122  The illegal items would include packaging that is commonly associated with illegal 
drugs, such as small baggies or vials.  It may also include firearms, if the robot is patrolling 
in a jurisdiction where firearms are illegal or where concealed carry permits are so hard to 
obtain that very few individuals are legally carrying guns.  Alternatively, the robot could be 
equipped with a database with photos of everyone who owned a concealed-carry permit, so 
once a firearm is detected, the robot could instantly scan the person’s face, compare it to the 
photos of legitimate gun owners, and only alert the human monitor if there was no match to a 
person with a permit. 
 123  The exact percentage could easily be altered, depending on where courts want to set 
the limit.  Up until now, courts have been very reluctant—even hostile—towards the idea of 
quantifying what percentage chance establishes probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but 
given the predictive power of new surveillance technology, that will likely change.  See 
Simmons, supra note 48, at 68–71.  Lower courts have already (albeit grudgingly) approved 
specific numerical success rates for drug dogs as sufficient to establish that the dog’s positive 
alert creates probable cause, holding that accuracy rates of between 50% and 60%, 50%, 55%, 
58%, and 60% were all sufficient to satisfy the probable cause standard.  See United States v. 
Anderson, 367 F. App’x 30, 33 (11th Cir. 2010) (approving a 55% rate); United States v. 
Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (approving a 58% rate); United States v. 
Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) (approving a 50% rate); United States v. Koon 
Chung Wu, 217 F. App’x 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2007) (approving a 60% rate); see also United 
States v. Sanchez-Tamayo, No. 1:10-CR-0532-JOF-JFK, 2011 WL 7767740, at *14 (N.D. 
Ga. Nov. 28, 2011) (noting that courts have approved a drug dog reliability rate of 
“approximately 50%–60%” as sufficient to establish probable cause).  But see United States 
v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting probable cause finding even 
though the drug dog had a 65% success rate).  These cases were all determining what 
percentage chance would be required to achieve probable cause; for a Terry stop, the police 
would only have to establish the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, so 50% would almost 
certainly be sufficient.  Wherever the percentage is set, it will take into account the error rate 
of the scanning device and the identification software, which (as with drug dogs) will be 
known quantities. 
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person attempting to break into a locked car or the window of a residence, or 
an exchange that resembles a drug sale—she can take control of the robot to 
investigate further.  Anything that a human officer on actual patrol might 
observe that leads to reasonable suspicion would also be grounds for the 
human officer who is monitoring the robot patrol from afar. 
Whether the reasonable suspicion is triggered by the robot’s algorithms, 
or by the human officer’s own observations, the next step would be for the 
human monitor to take control of the robot and approach the suspect.  The 
human officer then speaks through robot, ordering the suspect to stop.  If the 
suspect ignores the command or tries to leave the scene, the human officer 
would have the option of compelling the suspect to submit to the stop, 
whether through ordering the robot to grab the suspect or by using other non-
deadly force.  If the suspect flees the encounter, his photo can be broadcast 
to all of the other robots in the area, as well as to the human officers on patrol. 
If the detention is successful, the human officer begins to ask the 
suspect questions to confirm or dispel the suspicion.  Presumably the 
questioning will focus on the reason for the stop, such as: “It appears you 
have an item that may be contraband, in your right front pocket; can you tell 
me what you are carrying?” or “What were you doing inside that abandoned 
building?” or “Do you know the owner of that car?”  The robots would not 
be authorized to carry out any type of frisk or search; thus, the police officer’s 
investigation would be limited to the questions and answers from the 
conversation. 
If the human officer controlling the robot is able to develop probable 
cause through this investigation, she informs the suspect that he is under 
arrest and orders him to stay where he is until a human officer arrives to take 
custody of the suspect.  At this point the robot officer would be legally 
allowed to conduct a search, both under the search incident to lawful arrest 
doctrine and in order to protect the safety of the approaching human officer.  
As we will see, however, this search power may also be limited by the courts, 
though not to nearly the same degree as the Terry frisk. 
2.  Search Incident to Lawful Arrest 
In order to effectuate an arrest, a robot police officer would need to be 
able to detain a suspect for a prolonged period of time.124  As with Terry 
stops, a robot police officer could accomplish this through legal compulsion 
alone, though this may be more difficult to do for an arrest than for a Terry 
stop.  A robot could be equipped with handcuffs or plastic constraints that it 
could attach to the arrestee’s wrists if the arrestee cooperated.  Some 
 
 124  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (describing the legal difference between a 
stop and an arrest). 
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arrestees would cooperate, given the fact that the alternative would be an 
obstruction of justice charge and/or the arrival of a human police officer to 
physically manhandle the arrestee into handcuffs.  More sophisticated robots 
would also be able to employ non-deadly force to ensure compliance. 
It is likely that police departments will want to use robots to conduct 
arrests whenever it is feasible to do so.  Once the robot develops probable 
cause after a Terry stop or based on observations that it (and its human 
monitors) make while on patrol, it would be far more effective and safer if 
the robot could then arrest, search, and secure the defendant without having 
to wait for a human officer to arrive and put herself in danger.125  If police 
are executing an arrest warrant in someone’s home, it would be safer for the 
police to wait outside and send in a robot to search for the defendant, inform 
him that he is under arrest, secure him, search him, and then lead him out of 
the home in handcuffs to the waiting officers.  And because the robot officers 
would not be equipped to use deadly force and their human pilots would have 
little need or inclination to use non-deadly force to protect themselves, robot 
arrests would be safer for the arrestees as well. 
Once the robot officer has conducted the arrest, it will have the right to 
conduct a search incident to that arrest.  Depending on the technology 
available, the robot officer might conduct a crude sort of pat-down, order the 
suspect to reveal the items in his pockets, and/or conduct a scan of the 
suspect and transmit the actual images of the scan to the human monitor so 
that she can evaluate for herself if the suspect is carrying anything dangerous.  
The robot officer could also handcuff the suspect to ensure the safety of the 
human officer, or order the suspect to put his hands on his head or even to 
lie flat on the ground if there was reason to believe he was armed and 
dangerous. 
As with Terry stops, officer safety is a key component of the search 
incident to a lawful arrest doctrine; thus, when robot police officers make an 
arrest, their powers to search will also be curtailed.  The legal shift will likely 
be more subtle in this area than it is for Terry stops, for a number of reasons.  
First, a suspect who is being arrested will be brought to the police precinct, 
where he will inevitably be interacting with human police officers (and 
fellow arrestees); thus, the need to protect officer safety still exists even if a 
robot officer conducts the arrest.  Second, unlike Terry frisks, which are only 
permitted for officer safety, a search incident to lawful arrest is justified both 
on the grounds of officer safety and to prevent the suspect from destroying 
 
 125  In the near future, a robot officer would conduct the arrest and then escort the 
defendant to a self-driving police car, so that no human officer would have to interact with 
the arrestee until the car pulled up to the police precinct. 
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evidence.126  And third, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Robinson 
that the police power to conduct a search incident to lawful arrest doctrine is 
automatic—thus in theory it no longer relies upon the original justifications 
of officer safety and preservation of evidence.127 
Even so, some aspects of the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine 
may be adjusted when a robot police officer makes the arrest.  We have 
already seen one new technology—the cell phone—lead the Supreme Court 
to back away from Robinson’s automatic right to search doctrine and 
resurrect the original justifications of the rule and limiting the doctrine in 
certain circumstances.128  It is entirely possible that another new 
technology—robot police officers conducting arrests—will also lead the 
courts to reconsider the justifications and scope of the rule. 
The search incident to lawful arrest rule has been around for over a 
century,129 and it has evolved significantly during that time.  The rule 
originally existed so that police could ensure that the defendant could not 
access any weapons that might endanger the police officers or help him 
escape custody, and to enable the officers to seize any contraband or 
evidence from the defendant’s person so that he could not dispose of it or 
destroy it.130  These limitations led the Supreme Court to limit the geographic 
scope of the search to the defendant himself, any containers he was carrying, 
and the physical space around the defendant.131  This last area is known as 
the defendant’s “wingspan” and comprises of any area that the defendant 
could reach at the time of the arrest.132 
But these justifications—and any limitations based on these 
limitations—disappeared in 1973 in United States v. Robinson, the high-
water mark for the search incident to arrest power.133  In Robinson, the 
defendant was arrested for driving with a revoked driver’s license, and 
during a search incident to that arrest, the officer recovered a crumpled 
cigarette package from the defendant’s shirt pocket.134  Although the package 
could not possibly contain any weapon or evidence of the crime he was 
 
 126  Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1968). 
 127  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973) (“But quite apart from these 
distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its 
suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was 
present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a 
lawful arrest.”). 
 128  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
 129  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
 130  See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 131  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 132  Id. 
 133  414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 134  Id. at 220–223.  
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arrested for, driving with a revoked license, the officer opened the package, 
revealing heroin.135  The Supreme Court upheld the legality of the search, 
stating that “the fact of the lawful arrest [alone] establishes the authority to 
search.”136 
But two more recent cases have limited the scope of these searches by 
resurrecting the original justifications for the rule.  The first was Arizona v. 
Gant, in which the defendant drove up to his home, exited his car, and then 
was arrested a few feet away.137  The police handcuffed the defendant, placed 
him in the back of a police cruiser, and then searched his car.138  The Supreme 
Court found the search unconstitutional, noting that the defendant was 
handcuffed and secured, and so at the time of the search there was no danger 
of him reaching into the car to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.139  
Thus, under Gant police have no right to search a car incident to an arrest 
unless the defendant is “unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”140  Five years later, the 
Supreme Court decided the case of Riley v. California, in which the police 
officers looked through the defendant’s smartphone after stopping him “for 
driving with expired registration tags.”141  The Court once again returned to 
the original justification for the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine, 
noting that there is no way the contents of the cell phone could pose a danger 
to the officer and that the police could avoid destruction of evidence by 
turning the phone off or placing it inside a special bag that prevented it from 
receiving remote signals.142  The Court further found that the privacy interest 
for smartphones was much higher than for other types of containers, and so 
there was a greater reason to limit the doctrine in this context.143 
Given this trend, the courts should take a fresh look at the search 
incident to lawful arrest doctrine when it is applied to robot police officers.  
As noted in the Terry discussion above, when a robot officer performs an 
arrest, there is no immediate worry that the suspect will cause physical harm 
to a human police officer.  The defendant’s person still needs to be searched 
 
 135  Id. at 223.  
 136  Id. at 235. 
 137  556 U.S. 332, 336 (2009). 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search 
or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  When 
these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless 
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”). 
 140  Id. at 343. 
 141  573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). 
 142  Id. at 387–91. 
 143  Id. at 391–98. 
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for weapons, but the risk that he would be able to grab a weapon within his 
wingspan and use it to harm the robot officer as it was making an arrest 
carries no legal weight, because the arresting officer is property rather than 
a human being.  Thus, the rationale for searching the defendant’s wingspan 
would be weakened, since the only remaining justification for such a search 
would be to ensure that the defendant did not grab and destroy evidence that 
was nearby.  But the logic of Gant argues against this justification—the first 
thing a robot officer would do would be to handcuff the defendant, meaning 
that the defendant would have no way of reaching out to grab any kind of 
evidence or contraband.  Thus, using robot police officers could signal the 
end of the “wingspan” rule. 
A related rule that is almost certain not to apply to robot arrests is the 
“protective sweep” permitted under the Maryland v. Buie doctrine.144  Under 
this rule, when the police enter a home to effectuate an arrest (or for any 
other legal reason), and they have reason to believe that particular areas of 
the home may be harboring individuals who pose a threat to the arresting 
officers, the police can perform a cursory visual inspection of any of those 
areas where an individual may be hiding.145  Since the justification for 
protective sweeps lies solely in the risk of harm to human police officers, the 
legal power to conduct such a sweep disappears if there is no human police 
officer inside the house conducting the arrest.  A robot police officer who 
was sent into a home pursuant to an arrest warrant would only be allowed to 
search for the arrestee, secure him and search him, and then immediately 
leave the home without looking through any other rooms. 
Similarly, the doctrine of Michigan v. Long146 would not apply to robot 
police officers who conduct traffic stops.  Under Long, when a police officer 
pulls over a vehicle and has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is 
dangerous and may try to grab a weapon, the officer may search through any 
areas of the passenger compartment of the vehicle that could potentially hold 
a weapon.147  In many contexts, this allows police to conduct a thorough 
search of a vehicle after it is pulled over based only on a reasonable belief 
that the vehicle may contain a weapon.  If, however, the traffic stop is 
conducted by a robot police officer, there is no justification for a Long “frisk” 
of the automobile. 
 
 144  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 145  Id. at 334–35. 
 146  463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 147  Id. at 1049. 
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B.  Use-of-Force Situations 
The potential for robot police officers to use force against suspects 
raises two separate questions.  First, will widespread deployment of robot 
police officers result in more or less use of force by law enforcement?  And 
second, when evaluating the propriety of police actions, will courts treat the 
use of force by robot police officers differently than use of force by human 
police officers?  These are two separate questions, but they are related in a 
feedback loop: the less necessity there is for robots to use force, the less 
reasonable it will be for them to do so under the law, and the less reasonable 
it is for them to use force under the law, the less likely they are to actually 
do so. 
The American Civil Liberties Union argues that allowing police robots 
to use force will result in more force being used against suspects, since it will 
be “easier” to use force with a robot and police officers will have “poor[er] 
situational awareness” when they act through a machine because the cameras 
on the robots will not give the police a true sense of how a situation may be 
developing.148  On the other hand, police officers acting through robots will 
feel less fear and stress when confronting a potentially dangerous suspect, 
and so will be less likely to act unreasonably in using unnecessary force. 
The number and severity of use-of-force instances with robot police 
will also depend on how the robot is armed.  Police robots can be equipped 
with numerous non-lethal force tools, such as a grabbing arm, pepper spray, 
tear gas, or a conducted energy device (otherwise known as a CED or 
Taser).149  As demonstrated by the 2016 Dallas incident, it is even feasible 
 
 148  E.B. Boyd, Is Police Use of Force About to Get Worse—With Robots?, POLITICO (Sept. 
22, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/police-robots-ethics-debate-
214273.  Rick Nelson, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a 
former counterterrorism official on the National Security Council, agrees, noting “[t]he 
further we remove the officer from the use of force and the consequences that come with it, 
the easier it becomes to use that tactic . . . .  It’s what we have done with drones in warfare.”  
Fountain & Schmidt, supra note 4. 
 149  In 2014, Albuquerque police used a robot to “deploy chemical munitions” against a 
man who had barricaded himself in a motel room with a gun, leading to his surrender.  
Fountain & Schmidt, supra note 4. 
  Although giving police robots multiple tools of non-lethal force might make them less 
palatable to the community being policed, the empirical evidence from human police officers 
shows that increasing the options that a police officer has for non-lethal force tends to decrease 
the total number of injuries to suspects.  A study of twelve large law enforcement agencies in 
2010 concluded that use of pepper spray and Tasers decreased the likelihood of injuries to 
suspects by 65% and 70%, respectively.  See Philip Bulman, Police Use of Force: The Impact 
of Less-Lethal Weapons and Tactics, NIJ JOURNAL NO. 267 (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.nij.gov/journals/267/pages/use-of-force.aspx.  A similar study of the police 
departments in Austin and Orlando concluded that after CEDs were introduced to the police 
force, injury rates for both suspects and police forces dropped substantially.  Id.  The number 
of use-of-force cases increased in Orlando but decreased in Austin.  Id. 
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to equip a robot with the capacity to use deadly force.150  But as we will see 
below, it probably will not make sense to routinely equip police robots with 
this capability, because legally they will almost never be allowed to use it. 
From a legal perspective, courts will need to tighten the use-of-force 
rules for robot officers.151  Under current law, police use of force is 
considered to be a type of “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, and so it 
is legally justified only if it is objectively reasonable.152  This means police 
officers are generally permitted to use force if the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, or if he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by fleeing.153  The Supreme 
Court has held that reasonableness is determined “from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight.”154  In evaluating reasonableness, the Court has noted that “police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” with respect to the amount of 
force needed in a given situation.155 
Thus, just like the rules surrounding Terry frisks, rules surrounding 
police use of force are tied closely to the danger that the suspect poses to the 
(human) police officer in the scenario.  If the suspect only presents a physical 
danger to a robot, courts will be less willing to certify police use of force as 
“reasonable.”156  Furthermore, police officers who are safe and far removed 
from the scene are less likely to feel the tension, pressure, and fear of the 
 
 150  See Fountain & Schmidt, supra note 4. 
 151  Some disagree with this assertion; for example, the chairman of the National Tactical 
Officers Association notes that use-of-force laws apply to police regardless of what tool they 
use, arguing that “[t]he mechanism of how the force is delivered is irrelevant to the courts.”  
Boyd, supra note 148. 
 152  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  Most states impose the same 
standard as the federal courts; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 11.81.370 (West 1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 
(West 2018); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-5 (West 2012); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-41-3-3 
(West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1412 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7 (West 2019); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.235 (West 2018); 18 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508(a) (West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (2018); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51 (West 2007). 
 153  Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Other effects that robot police may have on use-of-force incidents are harder to predict.  
For example, suspects may be more likely to try to evade arrest when confronted by a robot 
than by a human police officer, either because they will have less respect for the authority 
asserted by a machine than by a person, or because they believe they will have a better chance 
of escaping.  If suspects tend to flee more often when lawfully detained or arrested by a robot, 
police will have to resort to force more often.   
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uncertain and rapidly evolving situation, which means that courts will hold 
police to a higher standard.157 
At the very least, the safety of the human pilot will mean that deadly 
force will almost never be legally justified.  The Dallas incident was unusual 
in that the police were confronted with an armed man who had already killed 
five police officers and represented an ongoing threat; in that context, lethal 
force was arguably necessary to protect the public.158  But in the vast majority 
of cases, a robot police officer will not have the legal right to use deadly 
force, and any robotic use of force which did result in death would be much 
more likely to result in legal liability for the human pilot and the police 
department.159 
Recent history has shown that human police mis-use deadly force all 
too often when they believe—sometimes mistakenly—that their lives are in 
danger.  Police officers rarely face legal consequences for these actions, 
either because the prosecutor decides not to press charges or because a judge, 
jury, or grand jury determines that given the potential threat to their lives, 
they were legally justified in their actions.160  In most of these situations, a 
 
 157  A further deterrent to robot police officers using force is the possibility that civil 
liability for robot harm could be much higher than for when human officers cause harm, both 
because juries will be less likely to see the force as reasonable, and because juries might show 
more sympathy for a scared, human police officer making a split-second decision with her 
life on the line than for a human officer miles away in safety operating a large violent machine 
that causes harm to a civilian. 
 158  See Fountain & Schmidt, supra note 4. 
 159  Courts will also have to explore whether the manufacturer of the robot or the 
programmer of the software could face liability if a robot malfunction leads to an improper 
use of force. 
 160  Police are often not prosecuted at all for lethal use of force, either because the 
prosecutor decides not to press charges, or the grand jury refuses to indict.  When prosecutions 
do occur, convictions of police officers are extremely rare—of over 3,000 criminal cases 
brought against police officers between April 2009 and December 2010, only 33% were 
convicted—about half the conviction rate compared to criminal cases overall.  German Lopez, 
Stephon Clark Police Shooting in Sacramento: Autopsy Released, VOX (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/3/22/17151960/stephon-clark-sacramento-police-
shooting-video.  A quick review of some of the more recent high-profile police shooting cases 
of unarmed civilians demonstrates this point—from Stephon Clark, who was fatally shot in 
his grandparents’ backyard in Sacramento when he held up an iPhone, to Tamir Rice, a 
twelve-year-old who was fatally shot when playing with a realistic toy gun in a public park in 
Cleveland, to Michael Brown, who was fatally shot by police when he allegedly charged a 
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri.  See id.; Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown 
of the Events That Led to the 12-Year-Old’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2017/01/tamir_rice_shooting_a_breakdow.html; 
Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-
after-police-shooting.html.  In each of these cases, a human pilot would almost certainly not 
have ordered the robot police officer to respond with deadly force, since there would be no 
imminent danger to any human at the time of the confrontation.   
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human pilot controlling a robot police officer from a safe distance would not 
feel the need to use deadly force—and if she did, the use of force would 
certainly be held to be illegal.  Even in a case where the suspect was actually 
armed with a deadly weapon, whether it is a car or a knife or a gun, a robot 
police officer would almost never need to use—nor be legally justified in 
using—deadly force.161 
IV. HYDRAULIC PRESSURES AND EQUILIBRIUM ADJUSTERS 
The Terry Court acknowledged that police officers needed to be able to 
flexibly respond to the “rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on 
city streets.”162  The lone Terry dissenter, Justice Douglas, saw the case 
differently; he noted that “[t]here have been powerful hydraulic pressures 
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down 
constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand.”163  In other 
words, when society, technology, or the substantive law shift to create more 
privacy, the shift often results in changes in procedural law or police practice 
to increase the power of the police to conduct surveillance.164  These 
hydraulic pressures can go both ways, as captured by Orin Kerr’s equilibrium 
adjustment theory.165  As Professor Kerr noted, when police deploy new 
surveillance tools like thermal imaging devices, GPS devices, and sense-
 
 161  See, e.g., Aaron Morrison, Albany Police Shot a Teen in the Back and Paralyzed Him. 
The D.A. Said It Was Justified., APPEAL (Mar. 22, 2019), https://theappeal.org/albany-police-
shot-a-teen-in-the-back-and-paralyzed-him-the-da-said-it-was-justified/ (officer shot a 
nineteen-year-old who allegedly ran at him with a hunting knife); Kelly Fisher, Police 
Shooting of Beth Plant—Mother of Boxer Caleb Plant—Deemed “Justified,” District AG 
Says, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/loc 
al/cheatham/2019/03/22/cheatham-county-police-shooting-beth-plant-justified/3252447002/ 
(officer fatally shot a woman who allegedly brandished a knife at him); Officials: No Charges 
Filed Against Officer That Shot at Suspect’s Car, NEWS CHANNEL 20 (July 3, 2019), 
https://newschannel20.com/news/local/officials-charges-will-not-be-filed-against-officer-
involved-in-shooting (officer shot a suspect when he ordered the suspect to get out of his 
vehicle but the suspect started to drive toward him, causing the officer to believe he was going 
to be run over; no charges were filed against the officer). 
 162  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). 
 163  Id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
 164  The Terry decision itself, which expanded police procedural powers, was decided 
during the same time period that courts across the country were limiting the power of the 
police by striking down overly vague vagrancy and loitering laws.  See, e.g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (following the trend of striking down overly 
vague vagrancy laws).  Thus, Terry’s expansion of police powers could be interpreted as a 
way to give back to police the power to confront suspicious individuals that they used to 
possess when enforcing the vagrancy laws.  
 165  See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). 
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enhancing devices, the courts often adjust Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
increase privacy rights.166 
How will this phenomenon play out in the context of robot police 
officers?  On the one hand, robots will act as a force multiplier, allowing the 
police to place far more “officers” in the field for the same cost.  
Furthermore, robot police officers will have greater surveillance capabilities, 
thus decreasing the privacy of citizens even further.  Privacy advocates have 
reacted with alarm to the prospect of widespread robot police; for example, 
the Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center has said 
that this development would “open[] the door to pervasive surveillance in 
public spaces . . . .  Robots will capture all of the activity around them—not 
only the guy who is acting suspiciously, but also the young couple holding 
hands or a guy just walking down the street.”167 
Under this theory, the amount of police surveillance was originally 
bounded by limited police resources; when those limits are removed, the 
courts must step in to impose greater legal restrictions to return the amount 
of surveillance to the status quo ante.  The Supreme Court is sympathetic to 
this claim that greater efficiency in law enforcement surveillance requires 
heightened Fourth Amendment protection.  In United States v. Jones,168 the 
Court considered the constitutionality of continuous monitoring of a car’s 
movements along public highways for a four-week period.  Precedent had 
established that monitoring a car’s movements on public highways was not 
a search,169 but a four-Justice concurrence in Jones argued that technological 
advances mandated an exception to that rule.170  In the pre-digital era, the 
concurrence pointed out, continuous twenty-four-hour surveillance of a 
person’s public movements was possible, but it was “difficult and costly and 
therefore rarely undertaken.”171  Because of this practical difficulty, law 
enforcement officers were usually discouraged from engaging in dragnet-
style public surveillance.  Now that GPS technology has made this type of 
surveillance possible, it would be feasible for law enforcement agencies to 
observe and record nearly every action civilians take in public, which would 
violate their reasonable expectation of privacy.  Therefore, the Court had to 
change the law to limit the police power to conduct this type of surveillance. 
 
 166  Id. at 496–502.  The most recent example of this reverse hydraulic pressure is 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  See infra note 172. 
 167  See Li, supra note 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168  565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 169  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 170  Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–431. 
 171  Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Most recently, in Carpenter v. United States,172 the Court addressed the 
government’s increased technological ability to monitor suspects’ locations 
through cell site location information (CSLI).173  This improved surveillance 
capacity led the Supreme Court to expand the mosaic theory and create an 
exception to the third-party doctrine, thus increasing Fourth Amendment 
protections in response to the government’s greater surveillance capacity.174  
As the Court noted: 
In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were 
limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection.  
With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in time 
to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention 
polices of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records 
for up to five years.175 
Thus, if robot police dramatically increase the government’s ability to 
conduct surveillance in public areas, the courts may feel the need to 
strengthen Fourth Amendment protections, probably by broadening the 
mosaic doctrine, to restrict what types of public surveillance police are 
allowed to conduct without a warrant. 
On the other hand, the use of robot police officers will also increase 
privacy in some ways, because there will be fewer pretextual Terry stops and 
far fewer frisks.  Police rely on Terry frisks to find drugs and weapons; many 
police argue that the procedure is a critical tool in keeping guns off the 
streets.176  If this power is taken away from the police, how will the courts 
and law enforcement respond? 
 
 172  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 173  Id. at 2211. 
 174  Id.  at 2217–19 (“Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides 
an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.  As with GPS information, the time-
stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his 
particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”) (internal quotations omitted); id. at 2219–20 (“We therefore decline to 
extend Smith and Miller to the collection of CSLI.  Given the unique nature of cell phone 
location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party 
does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.  The Government’s 
acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”) 
 175  Id. at 2218.  The Court also repeated the “potential dragnet” concern from the Jones 
concurrence, noting that the extremely low cost of these searches now allows police “secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”  
Id. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 465 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 176  Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & David L. Rosenthal, Flight, Race, and Terry Stops: 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 163 (2018) (“Police officers find 
critical the ability to stop, question, and frisk someone who is reasonably suspected of being 
involved in a crime and of being armed.”). 
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One possibility is that the courts will adjust the Terry doctrine to change 
the justification for frisks, thus allowing robots to conduct frisks even though 
there is no danger to a human officer.  Courts could make a number of 
doctrinal moves to achieve this goal.  First, they could argue that a Terry 
frisk would be justified to protect other individuals in the area.  This is a 
legitimate argument, since a close reading of Terry’s language reveals that 
the Court’s justification for the frisk is not always consistent.  At two points 
in the opinion, the Court states that the frisks are justified only so that the 
officer can protect himself against physical danger.177  At four other points 
in the opinion, the Court states that the power to frisk is justified so that the 
officer can protect himself or “others.”178  An expansive reading of Terry 
would allow police officers to conduct a frisk even if the police officer were 
in no danger, as long as the officer reasonably believed the suspect was a 
danger to others. 
But there are five reasons to reject this expansive interpretation.  One 
is the holding of Terry itself: in applying this new doctrine, the Court only 
noted the potential danger to Detective McFadden, not to anyone else.  
Another is Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Terry, in which he unequivocally 
states his own position that the majority decision only permits a frisk for the 
 
 177  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24, 27 (1968) (“[T]here is the more immediate 
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is 
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.  
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the 
performance of their duties.  American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and 
every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and 
thousands more are wounded.  Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the 
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives . . . .  Our evaluation of the proper balance that has 
to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn 
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, 
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, 
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”).  
Additionally, in a footnote, the Court describes the issue before it as “assess[ing] the need for 
some form of self-protective search power.”  Id. at 24 n.21 (emphasis added). 
 178  See id. at 24, 26, 27, 29 (“When an officer is justified in believing that the individual 
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous 
to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the 
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon 
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm . . . .  Thus [the frisk] must be limited to that 
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or 
others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ search, 
even though it remains a serious intrusion . . . .  The officer need not be absolutely certain that 
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger . . . .  The sole 
justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and 
others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police 
officer.”) (emphasis added). 
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protection of the police officer, not “from any broader right to disarm.”179  A 
third is the fifty years of jurisprudence following Terry, in which courts have 
focused exclusively on the danger to the police officer and rarely—if ever—
allowed a Terry frisk in order to protect other individuals.180  Fourth is the 
logic underlying Terry: according to Terry, the police have no right to frisk 
a suspect until they detain the subject to investigate potential criminal 
activity.  Thus, it is the close interaction with the police officer that creates 
the potential danger that the Terry frisk is meant to mitigate.  Were this not 
the case, and “danger to others” alone was a legitimate basis for a Terry frisk, 
police officers could conduct frisks of any individual whom they believe may 
have a weapon even without conducting a Terry stop—a result that neither 
Terry nor any subsequent case has allowed.181  And a final reason why 
“danger to others” should not be a legitimate justification for a Terry frisk is 
that this scenario is already covered by another Fourth Amendment doctrine: 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  Under the 
exigent circumstances exception, police are allowed to search an individual 
if they have probable cause to believe that evidence will be removed or 
destroyed before a warrant can be obtained and that immediate action is 
required.182  In determining whether the exigent circumstance apply, courts 
apply a flexible, multi-factor balancing test that is very fact-dependent.183  It 
would be illogical to sweep all of that jurisprudence away and replace it with 
a “reasonable suspicion” standard just because an individual was the subject 
of a Terry stop. 
Another way in which courts could expand the Terry doctrine would be 
to allow for a frisk in order to protect damage to police property, i.e., the 
 
 179  Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Unlike the majority, Justice Harlan never 
equivocates in his rationale for a Terry frisk; he consistently states that the purpose of the frisk 
is only to protect officer safety.  See, e.g., id. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Once [the stop] 
was justified, however, the officer’s right to take suitable measures for his own safety 
followed automatically.”). 
 180  Supreme Court cases applying Terry have all focused on the danger to the officers, 
and have not mentioned the danger to others.  See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 
(1979) (“Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, 
may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in 
the possession of the person he has accosted.”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) 
(“The Court recognized in Terry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop 
should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.”). 
 181  Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–27. 
 182  STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK § 36:16 (4th 
ed. 2018). 
 183  Courts look to factors such as the gravity and violent nature of the offense; whether 
there is probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime; and a likelihood the 
suspect will escape (or that evidence will be destroyed) if the suspect is not swiftly 
apprehended.  See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769–70 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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robot itself.  In other words, courts could rule that a reasonable suspicion that 
the suspect posed a risk to police property would balance out the privacy 
interests of a suspect, so that a frisk for weapons by a robot police officer 
would be reasonable.  This would be a significant shift of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, since as of now there are no cases that conclude that reasonable 
suspicion of risk to property can justify a frisk of a person.184 
Still, another possibility will be for courts to extend the justification for 
robot frisks to include the preservation of evidence.  Police will argue that 
when a guilty suspect is stopped by a robot officer, and the field interrogation 
begins, there will likely be a point at which the suspect knows that he is going 
to be arrested.  At that time the suspect has an incentive to flee and destroy 
or dispose of the evidence before he is caught.  As noted above, the suspect 
will face an arrest for failing to stop,185 but that charge is likely far less severe 
than the drug or weapons charges he might have faced had he stayed put and 
submitted to an arrest by the robot.  Thus, in order to prevent this occurrence, 
the robot would need to conduct a frisk of the suspect immediately upon the 
commencement of the Terry stop, because once the field interrogation results 
in probable cause, the suspect will flee and it will be too late to detect and 
seize the contraband.  This would involve an extension of the Terry doctrine 
by the courts, but they would be extending it into relatively familiar ground, 
since prevention of spoliation of evidence is already a justification for a 
search incident to lawful arrest.186  This adjustment to Terry would merely 
involve moving the right to search back in time to allow for a preemptive 
frisk in anticipation of a possible arrest. 
 
 184  Of course, a stop could be based on reasonable suspicion that a person was likely to 
commit a crime involving property damage; a Terry stop could be based on reasonable 
suspicion of any type of crime.  See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 154 (1972) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“Terry stops are ‘meant for the serious cases of imminent danger or of harm 
recently perpetrated to persons or property.’”) (quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38–
39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).  But a police officer could not conduct a frisk of 
the suspect during that stop unless she had reason to believe the suspect posed a risk of 
physical harm to herself. 
  Also, if police have probable cause to believe that a person committed a property 
crime, they can obtain a search warrant, or obtain an arrest warrant and conduct a search 
incident to lawful arrest.  But there is no case that has authorized a search based on reasonable 
belief that the suspect posed a risk to property. 
 185  See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 186  See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (“It is well established that ‘exigent 
circumstances,’ including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police 
officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.”); 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction.”). 
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Equilibrium adjustment could also come from the police themselves.  If 
the courts refuse to expand the Terry doctrine, police could refuse to adopt 
robot police officers unless the robots had sufficient investigative skills to 
compensate for the loss of the frisk power.  Police departments have already 
balked at adopting robotic technology unless the robots were able to do 
everything a live police office is able to do.  For example, when a company 
that designed a prototype of a robot that would interact with drivers during a 
traffic stop presented its invention to police officers, many of the officers 
objected that the robot could not look into other parts of the vehicle to 
conduct a “plain view” search for weapons, drugs, or alcohol.187  Also, unlike 
a human officer, the robot could not detect alcohol on the individual’s breath.  
The company thus plans on upgrading its machine to allow the camera to 
look around the inside of the car and to include a passive alcohol sensor 
which could simulate an officer’s sense of smell.188  In addition to ensuring 
that robot police could do everything human police can do, the government 
might only deploy robots that have some of the advanced abilities discussed 
in the last section,189 such as the capacity to scan faces to look for individuals 
with outstanding warrants, or to scan suspects to learn what they are carrying 
in their pockets. 
If these new powers are not sufficient, and courts fail to adjust the law 
to allow robot police officers to conduct Terry frisks, some police 
departments may not see the introduction of robots as an improvement of the 
status quo.  If police departments believe that Terry frisks themselves are 
effective and necessary to get guns off the street, or to establish dominance 
over individuals who live in the neighborhoods being policed,190 they may 
prefer to keep human officers on patrol so that they can continue the Terry 
frisks.  Such a choice, of course, would come at a cost to officer safety; the 
police would choose to continue to put human officers in danger when 
replacing or supplementing them with robots would allow some of them to 
do their jobs from a safe distance.191  A related issue, which is beyond the 
 
 187  See Holley, supra note 57. 
 188  Id. 
 189  See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 190  Not only would robot police officers not be permitted to conduct Terry frisks, which 
remove a dominance-establishing tool from the police arsenal, but the presence of the robot 
officers themselves may not succeed in asserting control over the neighborhood in the same 
way as the presence of human police officers, especially if (as is likely) they are not equipped 
to use deadly force and they are designed to look benign and non-threatening. 
 191  Of course, courts might intervene and hold that it is unreasonable to use human police 
officers if robots offer a less intrusive means of reaching the same goal; however, given the 
different capabilities of robot officers, and the complex financial decisions a precinct will 
have to make in deciding whether to replace its human officers with robot officers, it is 
unlikely that a court will be willing to micromanage police to this degree. 
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scope of this paper, is how police unions would react to the introduction of 
robots.  Robots will not replace all police officers, but the future envisioned 
by this article would realize cost savings and greater efficiency by reducing 
the number of police officers and having many of their jobs performed by 
machines.  This is likely to give some police officers another, more concrete 
reason to resist the introduction of robots, regardless of how much safer and 
more efficient the robots might be. 
To get the best of both worlds, police officers may consent to the 
introduction of robot police, but whenever a robot officer conducts a Terry 
stop, follow a procedure in which the robot merely orders the suspect to stay 
in place until a human police officer arrives to conduct the field 
interrogation.  Once a human officer was on the way, the robot would be 
permitted to conduct a robotic frisk to ensure the safety of the approaching 
officer.  Also, the human officer herself would be permitted to conduct a 
traditional frisk once she arrived.  This procedure would of course put the 
human police officer in the field at greater risk than if the robot officer 
conducted the entire field interrogation, but police officers may believe it 
would be worth the extra evidentiary benefits of a frisk. 
Courts, however, might not accept this bifurcated procedure.  Under the 
Terry doctrine, the duration of a Terry stop is limited to a “short period of 
time”;192 thus, the police cannot extend the Terry stop beyond what is 
reasonable.  For example, in United States v. Place, the police conducted a 
Terry stop of the defendant at the airport, and then ordered him to wait ninety 
minutes while they transported his bags to a nearby airport, where a drug dog 
confirmed the presence of cocaine.193  The Supreme Court held that under 
these circumstances, the delay was too long.194  More recently, the Court 
evaluated the length of a traffic stop in Rodriguez v. United States.195  In 
Rodriguez, the police officer completed all the necessary steps of the traffic 
stop in twenty-one minutes, and then forced the defendant to wait another 
five minutes for backup to arrive so that the officer could walk his dog 
around the car to search for narcotics.  The Court held that any delay beyond 
what was necessary to complete the mission of the traffic stop was 
impermissible.196 
 
 192  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
 193  462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 194  Id. at 709 (“[T]he brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive 
as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.”). 
 195  575 U.S. 348 (2015). 
 196  Id. at 354. 
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Thus, it is an open question as to whether courts would allow police 
robots to extend a detention until a human police officer arrived.  Given the 
language of Place and Rodriguez, courts are likely to look to whether it was 
in fact necessary for a human police officer to be on the scene in order to 
effectively conduct the Terry stop.  The reasonableness of a delay for a 
human officer will be dependent upon the sophistication of the police robot; 
the more capabilities it has, the less justification there is to wait for a human 
officer.  Another factor would be the response time of the human police 
officer, since the length of the detention is a factor in its reasonableness.  A 
police department that took full advantage of the efficiencies of robot 
officers by only deploying a handful of human officers in the field would 
have a longer human response time to a robotic Terry stop, which would 
increase the chances the stop would be deemed unreasonable and illegal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legitimate concerns for officer safety have been used to justify broad 
police powers over the past fifty years.  The advent of robot police officers 
has the potential to make policing much safer by allowing police to conduct 
Terry stops, traffic stops, and even searches and arrests without putting their 
own lives in danger, which in turn will lead courts to curtail the search 
powers that are based in officer safety.  Robot police will also reduce the 
need for police to engage in force and deadly force, which means that courts 
will hold police to higher standards for evaluating when such force is 
justified.197 
 
 197  A distinct but related question is how the adoption of robotic technology by civilians 
will affect the ability of police to conduct surveillance.  For example, if self-driving cars 
become the norm on our streets, the ability for police to conduct traffic stops would disappear.  
See Rachael Roseman, When Autonomous Vehicles Take over the Road: Rethinking the 
Expansion of the Fourth Amendment in a Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 3 (2013) (arguing that government will lobby for the right to stop driverless cars even 
without reasonable suspicion in order to prevent drug trafficking); Jordan Blair Woods, 
Autonomous Vehicles and Police De-escalation, 114 NW. L.R. ONLINE 74 (2019) (arguing that 
traffic stops will become far less common because self-driving cars will be programmed to 
follow all traffic laws).  Currently, police routinely leverage traffic stops into further 
investigations by using the plain view doctrine to look inside a car to make observations, or 
using a drug dog during the stop, or asking for consent to search the car.  All of these tools 
will disappear if self-driving cars regularly obey traffic laws.  Furthermore, drunk driving 
checkpoints will no longer be necessary, and the Supreme Court has said that checkpoints to 
detect criminal activity inside the car are illegal.  See generally City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (invalidating a police checkpoint whose primary purpose was to 
use drug dogs to check for narcotics in the car).  Another question is how courts will treat 
autonomous vehicles with no people inside at all—delivery trucks or autonomous taxis 
waiting for passengers.  Would the owners of these vehicles have the same Fourth 
Amendment rights as the driver of a car, or would their privacy interests be lower, perhaps 
allowing for a search of the car on mere reasonable suspicion? 
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Robot police will also force changes in numerous other legal doctrines, 
in ways that may be hard to predict.  As semi-autonomous robots become 
more autonomous, they will begin to make their own decisions in more 
complicated situations.  Eventually a robot officer will approach the abilities 
of the police robots in science fiction and make its own decision as to when 
to conduct a Terry stop or a traffic stop.  At that point, the algorithms that 
guide the robot’s decision-making process will need to be designed to track 
the law of reasonable suspicion.  The goal would be for these machines to be 
able to make decisions free of irrational fear or bias; thus, when the robot is 
deciding to conduct a Terry stop, make an arrest, or employ force, it would—
in theory—make such a decision based only on relevant legal factors.  These 
robots would determine reasonable suspicion based on demonstrably proven 
correlations and concrete factors, moving beyond the vague intuitions and 
empirically questionable factors such as “high crime area” or “furtive 
movements.”198  Of course, modern algorithms that guide police conduct (or 
judicial conduct) have been subject to significant criticism, in part because—
if not properly designed—they can end up reinforcing existing biases in the 
system rather than curing them.199  These concerns would be even greater if 
a robot police officer were making its decisions free from human input. 
But in the near future, the transition from human patrols to robot patrols 
will call for a more subtle but still significant change in the legal regulation 
of police/civilian interaction.  Police robots will see and record more than 
their human counterparts, but they will have far less authority to conduct 
frisks and use physical force.  This will lead to a shift from physical 
surveillance, with enforcement based on physical compulsion, towards more 
comprehensive visual surveillance, with enforcement based on legal 
compulsion.200  The result will be a safer, but less anonymous, world. 
 
 198  See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting a New York City police officer as describing 
“furtive movement” as “a very broad concept” which include a person “‘changing direction, 
‘walking in a certain way,’ ‘[a]cting a little suspicious,’ ‘making a movement that is not 
regular,’ being ‘very fidgety,’ ‘going in and out of his pocket,’ ‘going in and out of a location,’ 
‘looking back and forth constantly,’ ‘looking over their shoulder,’ ‘adjusting their hip or their 
belt,’ ‘moving in and out of a car too quickly,’ ‘[t]urning a part of their body away from you,’ 
‘[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,’ ‘getting a little nervous, maybe 
shaking,’ and ‘stutter[ing].’”) (emphasis omitted). 
 199  See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; 
Matt Stroud, The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, But Is 
It Racist?, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/ 
the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist. 
 200  It will also accelerate the big data phenomenon of collecting and retaining massive 
amounts of data, which will lead to inevitable questions of data sharing among police 
departments, and between police departments and other government agencies.   
